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In 1992, the Law Lords (the judicial arm of the House of Lords) overruled more than two 
centuries of precedent when it decided in Pepper v. Hart that courts could refer to and rely on 
legislative history to aid in construing enacted laws. The ensuing fourteen years have witnessed a 
robust debate among British judges and legal scholars as to the scope and propriety of Pepper.
This article offers the first empirical and comparative analysis of how Britain’s highest court has 
used previously excluded legislative history materials in its judicial decisions. 
 
Although the Law Lords opened the door to reliance on legislative history at a time when 
the U.S. Supreme Court has been clamping down on such usage, the article demonstrates that 
citation to parliamentary materials by the Law Lords since 1996 does not approach the levels of 
reliance on congressional materials currently practiced by the Supreme Court. Notwithstanding 
Justice Scalia’s appreciable influence, Supreme Court justices continue to make use of legislative 
history in their opinions between three and five times more often than their counterparts in 
Britain. The article accounts for this divergent pattern of U.S. and British usage based on certain 
key differences in their respective lawmaking processes and structures—notably the disparate 
roles played by standing committees, the varying importance of legislative bargains following 
bill introduction, and the breadth of legislative history sources available under each system.  
 
Still, despite a spirited reaction to Pepper by several judges on the Law Lords, references 
to legislative history have increased since 2000. Moreover, the Law Lords in two very recent 
decisions have gone beyond Pepper in setting forth grounds for relying on parliamentary 
materials.  The article predicts that Britain’s highest court is in the process of consolidating if not 
augmenting a permanent role for legislative history as an interpretive asset. The article then 
suggests how this development should invite a different kind of dialogue about legislative history 
among justices on the U.S. Supreme Court.  
 
2Below the Surface:  Comparing Legislative History Usage by
The House of Lords and the Supreme Court
James J. Brudney*
INTRODUCTION 
[L]aws are not abstract propositions.  They are expressions of policy arising out of 
specific situations and addressed to the attainment of particular ends.  The difficulty is 
that the legislative ideas which laws embody are both explicit and immanent.  And so the 
bottom problem is:  what is below the surface of the words and yet fairly a part of them?1
Our legal community is not alone in debating the use of legislative history as a resource 
for the interpretation of statutes.  In 1992, the House of Lords in Pepper v. Hart2 overruled more 
than two centuries of precedent when it decided that courts could refer to and rely on Hansard—
the official record of standing committee proceedings and parliamentary debates—to aid in 
construing enacted laws.  The ensuing period has witnessed intense disagreements over the scope 
and propriety of Pepper. As is true in the U.S., the British debate has occurred among legal 
scholars3 as well as judges, and the judicial exchanges have taken place both in academic 
settings4 and through pronouncements from the bench.5
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1 Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 533 (1947). 
2 Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v. Hart, [1993] 1 All Eng. Rep. 42, [1993] A.C. 593. 
3 Compare Scott C. Styles, The Rule of Parliament:  Statutory Interpretation After Pepper v. Hart, 14 OXFORD J. 
LEG. STUD. 151 (1994) (criticizing the decision) and J. H. Baker, Case and Comment:  Statutory Interpretation and 
Parliamentary Intention, 52 CAMB. L. J. 353 (1993) (same) with Stefan Vogenauer, A Retreat from Pepper v. Hart?:  
A Reply to Lord Steyn, 25 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 629 (2005) (defending the decision). 
4 Compare Lord Steyn, Pepper v. Hart: A Re-Examination, 21 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 59 (2001) (criticizing the 
decision) and Lord Millett, Construing Statutes, 20 STAT. L. REV. 107 (1999) (same) with Lord Hoffman, The 
Intolerable Wrestle With Words and Meanings, 114 S. A. L. J. 656, 669 (1997) (justifying the decision in part). 
5 Compare, e.g., Reg. (Jackson and others) v. Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56, [2005] 4 All Eng. Rep. 1253, 
1285 (Lord Steyn) (criticizing and declining to rely on Pepper) and Robinson v. Secretary of State for Northern 
Ireland and others [2002] UKHL 32, [2002] N. Ir. L. R. 390, 400, 404-05, 413, 420 (opinions of Lords Bingham, 
3The judicial arm of the House of Lords—known as the Law Lords6—has opened the door 
to the use of legislative history at a time when the Supreme Court has been clamping down on 
such usage.7 Accordingly, one might wonder if the British and American judicial systems are in 
the process of trading places on this interpretive issue.  In fact, however, citation to Hansard by 
the Law Lords in the past decade does not approach the levels of reliance on legislative history 
practiced by the Supreme Court.  Notwithstanding the appreciable influence of Justice Scalia, 
Supreme Court justices continue to make use of legislative history in their opinions between 
three and five times more often than their counterparts in Britain.8
On the other hand, despite a spirited reaction to Pepper by several members of the Law 
Lords,9 references to Hansard have been increasing in the years since 2000.  Moreover, the great 
majority of judges serving on Britain’s highest court over the past decade have invoked 
legislative history materials in their opinions, many on a repeated basis.10 Thus, even if the Law 
Lords are unlikely to value legislative history to the same extent as the Supreme Court, a new era 
 
Hoffman, Hobhouse, Millett) (same) with Reg. (Jackson and others) v. Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56, [2005] 4 
All Eng. Rep. 1253, 1276-77 (opinion of Lord Nicholls) (defending and relying on Pepper), Mirvahedy v. Henley 
and another [2003] UKHL 16, [2003] 2 All Eng. Rep. 401 (opinion of Lord Walker) (same), and Harding v. 
Wealands [2006] UKHL 32, [2006] 3 WLR 83, 93, 104, 106-07 (opinions of Lords Hoffman, Rodger, Carswell) 
(same). 
6 The House of Lords as a court consists of the Lord Chancellor plus twelve Lords of Appeal in Ordinary.  See 
Administration of Justice Act 1968, s.1(1)(a), as amended in 1994.  See generally Glynn Dymond, The Appellate 
Jurisdiction of the House of Lords 10-11 (House of Lords Library Note, 2006).  The Lords of Appeal in Ordinary—
usually referred to as the Law Lords—are appointed by the Queen upon recommendation from the Prime Minister, 
which in turn is based on advice from the Lord Chancellor.  The Law Lords, who are made life peers, review 
appeals in panels that typically consist of five members but may be as few as three and, in relatively rare cases, as 
many as seven or even nine if the issues presented are viewed as especially difficult or important.  See Terence 
Ingman, THE ENGLISH LEGAL PROCESS 4-6 (10th ed. 2004); Michael Zander, THE LAW-MAKING PROCESS 339-42 
(6th ed. 2004). 
7 See, e.g. Michael H. Koby, The Supreme Court’s Declining Reliance on Legislative History: The Impact of Justice 
Scalia’s Critique, 36 HARV. J. LEGIS. 369, 384-87 (1999); James J. Brudney and Corey Ditslear, The Decline and 
Fall of Legislative History?  Patterns of Supreme Court Reliance in the Burger and Rehnquist Eras, 89 JUDICATURE 
220, 222-24 (2006). 
8 See Part II.A. infra.
9 See Part I.C. infra. 
10 See Part II.A. infra.
4of reliance on that history has been launched, and the debate among British judges is instructive 
from a comparative standpoint. 
This article offers the first empirical examination of how often, and in what ways, 
Britain’s highest court has used previously excluded legislative history materials in its judicial 
decisions.  It also represents the first effort to compare legislative history treatment between the 
Law Lords and the Supreme Court.  The article’s comparative inquiry identifies differences in 
the frequency with which legislative history is invoked in each court’s decisions, and offers 
explanations for the distinct patterns of usage that have emerged. 
Several key differences in national lawmaking structures and processes help account for 
why legislative history usage remains substantially greater in the Supreme Court than in the Law 
Lords.11 For a start, the committee report—a primary source of reliable legislative history in the 
American context—is essentially absent from the British setting, where parliamentary standing 
committees play only a peripheral role in creating and explaining bill language.  Further, 
negotiation and compromise following bill introduction are normal features of Congress’s 
decentralized and discontinuous decisionmaking but are exceptional occurrences under the more 
efficient methods by which bills are enacted in Parliament.  Because legislative history in the 
U.S. typically addresses the meaning of text that has been modified if not recast during the 
lawmaking process, the Supreme Court often refers to that history to help understand legislative 
bargains.  Conversely, because legislative compromise is rarely required under Britain’s party-
controlled parliamentary regime, there is less need to refer to Hansard to explain text that 
remains substantially unaltered since its introduction.  Finally, parliamentary materials approved 
for citation under the rule of Pepper consist almost exclusively of statements by government 
 
11 See Part II.C. infra.
5ministers.12 By contrast, our legislative history includes a richer and more diverse set of 
materials generated at different stages by Congress and its committees, with executive branch 
representatives cast in supporting roles at Congress’s invitation.13 
Still, accepting that there are institutional reasons to anticipate less frequent use of 
legislative history by the Law Lords than by the Supreme Court, the British innovation of 
invoking Hansard as an interpretive aid is alive and well after fourteen years.  The Law Lords 
have recently indicated that parliamentary materials may be used under conditions broader than 
those set forth in Pepper, and Hansard is admissible based on much the same intentionalist and 
purposive justifications as have been applied by the Supreme Court to value legislative history 
when construing statutory text.  Although it remains early in the Law Lords’ venture with this 
new interpretive asset, the article predicts that reliance on Hansard will continue and may even 
increase in the future.  The article then uses comparative analysis to offer preliminary thoughts as 
to how each country’s highest court might learn from the other in their respective approaches to 
legislative history usage. 
The Law Lords since Pepper have framed their disagreements over legislative history in 
less polarized terms than have been applied in the U.S. setting.  British judges have tended to 
argue over when and to what extent Hansard is probative in assisting courts to interpret 
Parliament’s laws, whereas the current contest on the Supreme Court has been about whether 
 
12 See Pepper, supra note 2, [1993] 1 All Eng. Rep. at 64, 69 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson). 
13 Recent controversy over the proliferation of signing statements by President Bush reflects the novelty of unilateral 
forays into bill interpretation by the executive branch, forays that would be far less controversial in a system 
dominated by executive branch commentary.  See Amer. Bar Assn. Task Force on Presidential Signing Statements 
and the Separation of Powers Doctrine, Report and Recommendations 20, 26 (July 24, 2006) (urging that presidents 
cease using signing statements to state an intention to interpret or enforce a law inconsistent with the will of 
Congress, and observing that most courts give little or no weight to signing statements as “legislative history”); The 
Use of Presidential Signing Statements:  Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 109th Cong. __ (June 27, 
2006) (Statements by Sen. Specter (Chair) and Sen. Leahy (ranking member) (critical of President Bush’s 
unprecedented use of signing statements)). 
6legislative history should be admissible in court at all.14 Our judicial conversations could profit 
from Britain’s more textured approach. 
 At the same time, legislative history applications adopted by the Law Lords have 
involved a shifting series of aspirationally objective rules.  The search for bright-line answers 
may reflect an understandable judicial impulse to direct and confine the use of this new and 
potentially open-ended interpretive resource.  Yet the Supreme Court’s relatively ad hoc method 
of applying legislative history, although messier in conceptual terms, arguably does a better job 
of promoting flexibility in the interpretive enterprise.  Such flexibility should be valued more by 
Britain’s judiciary as it gains experience in reviewing and assessing parliamentary materials.  
 Part I of the Article presents recent developments in Britain, including the basic rule of 
Pepper v. Hart and some key modifications or refinements of the rule announced in subsequent 
decisions.  Part II begins with a quantitative comparison between the Law Lords’ invocation of 
Hansard since 1996 and the Supreme Court’s use of legislative history during the same time 
period.  Part II then considers whether there are sound reasons for courts to rely less often on 
legislative history in Britain than in the United States.  The comparison focuses on the nature of 
the legislative process in the two countries and on separation of powers issues, including the 
risks of opportunistic behavior by creators of legislative history.  Part III examines certain 
elements of the current debate among British judges, using these elements to predict future uses 
of Hansard by the Law Lords.  Part III also identifies differences between the British and 
American approaches that may be instructive for the Supreme Court in one respect and for the 
Law Lords in another. 
 
14 See generally John F. Manning, Justice Scalia and the Legislative Process, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 33 
(2006). 
7I. CHANGES WROUGHT BY PEPPER V. HART 
In the United States, federal courts began relying on legislative history to construe 
statutes in the latter part of the nineteenth century.15 The Supreme Court’s robust appetite for 
this interpretive resource dates primarily from the period after 1940, but judicial reliance 
increased gradually during much of the twentieth century.16 The absence of a single moment of 
self-conscious change by our courts contrasts notably with British experience.  Pepper v. Hart 
was a watershed decision in constitutional as well as practical terms, and the Law Lords have 
revisited the ruling and its effects in remarkably frank terms.  After fourteen years of soul 
searching and some second thoughts, Britain’s highest court seems unlikely to backtrack on its 
commitment to the utility of legislative history as an interpretive resource. 
A.  The Law Before Pepper 
 As far back as 1769, British courts refused to consider parliamentary proceedings as an 
aid to statutory construction.17 By the mid nineteenth century, courts had extended the 
exclusionary rule to bar examination of pre-legislative preparatory materials, such as reports 
authored by government-appointed commissioners that often formed the basis for the statute 
under review.18 The courts relaxed this harsher approach around 1900, allowing judges to refer 
in their opinions to commission reports and White Papers19 for the purpose of determining the 
 
15 For a major decision inaugurating modern practice, see Rector of Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 
457, 464-65 (1892).  For isolated earlier examples, see Blake v. National Bank, 90 U.S. 307, 319-20 (1875); 
Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U.S. 453, 459-60 (1879). 
16 See United States v. American Trucking Assn., 310 U.S. 534, 543-49 (1940); Frankfurter, supra note 1, at 543; 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Legislative History Values, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 365, 392 (1990). 
17 Millar v. Taylor, (1769) 2 Burr. 2303, 2332 (Willes J.) (KB).  See Pepper, [1993] 1 All Eng. Rep. at 60-61 (Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson). 
18 Salkeld v. Johnson (1848) 154 E.R. 487, 495; 2 Exch. 256, 273.  See Pepper, [1993] 1 All Eng. Rep. at 61 (Lord-
Browne-Wilkinson). 
19 White Papers (printed on white paper) announce reasonably firm government policy on a particular issue and 
precede the introduction of a bill.  In the words of former Prime Minister Harold Wilson, “A White Paper is 
essentially a statement of government policy in such terms that withdrawal or major amendment, following 
consultation or public debate, tends to be regarded as a humiliating withdrawal.”  HAROLD WILSON, THE LABOUR 
8“mischief” a statute was intended to address, although not for the purpose of construing the 
words chosen by Parliament to address that mischief.20 Still, as late as 1980, it was technically 
prohibited for parties to cite in court anything said in the House of Commons without first 
obtaining consent from the House.21 
The justifications offered for excluding all references to parliamentary proceedings have 
been both constitutional and pragmatic.  From a constitutional standpoint, Article 9 of the 
English Bill of Rights safeguards the freedom of parliamentary debates and proceedings against 
impeachment or questioning in the courts or other locations besides Parliament.22 Some judges 
and scholars concluded that this provision protects not simply the freedom of parliamentary 
debate but the debates and proceedings as a whole, maintaining that to review or analyze in court 
what is said by a bill sponsor or government minister in committee or on the floor of Parliament 
is to violate Article 9.23 A second constitutional justification, based on separation of powers, was 
that allowing floor statements by individual legislators to shed light on the intent or effect of a 
law would confuse the distinct roles of Parliament as sovereign in the making of laws and courts 
as sovereign in their interpretation.24 
The earliest judicial explanation for refusing to admit parliamentary materials, however, 
was practical rather than constitutional—House of Commons debates were not fully or 
 
GOVERNMENT 1964-70, 380 (1971).  By contrast, Green Papers announce more tentative government proposals, 
ready for public discussion but with the government remaining uncommitted.  Id.  See generally Gary Slapper & 
David Kelly, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 57 (6th ed. 2003).  
20 Eastman Photographic Materials Co. Ltd. v. Comptroller-General of Patents, Designs and Trademarks [1898] 
A.C. 571, 575 (Earl of Halsbury, LC).  See Pepper, [1993] 1 All Eng. Rep. at 61 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson). 
21 David Miers, Citing Hansard as an Aid to Interpretation, 4 STAT. L. REV. 98, 99 (1983).  See Zander, supra note 
6, at 161. 
22 Article 9 states Parliament’s resolution “That the freedom of speech, and debates or proceedings in parliament, 
ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of parliament.”  1 W.&M., sess. 2, c. 2 (1689).   
23 See Francis Bennion, Hansard—Help or Hindrance?  A Draftman’s View of Pepper v. Hart, 14 STAT. L. REV. 149, 
152 n. 14 (1993) (citing William Blackstone, 1 COMMENTARIES 163 (17th ed. 1830)).  Hansard’s Official Report 
includes the edited verbatim proceedings from both Houses and their standing committees.  See 
www.parliament.uk/Hansard.
24 See Pepper, [1993] 1 All Eng. Rep. at 63-64 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson) (reciting argument for exclusion 
propounded by the Government). 
9accurately reported.25 Even after 1909, when Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates offered an 
authoritative and comprehensive report of proceedings,26 the time and expense involved in 
reading all potentially relevant debates, and the special burden this would impose on parties with 
lesser resources, continued to be regarded as serious obstacles.27 In 1969, when the Law 
Commissions of England and Scotland presented their comprehensive report on statutory 
interpretation, the commissioners recognized that Hansard was sufficiently relevant to the 
interpretative task of courts to warrant consideration.28 Nonetheless, the commissioners 
recommended that the exclusionary rule be retained largely for practical reasons.  They pointed 
to the difficulty of isolating the truly valuable information found in parliamentary debates and 
the consequent challenge of providing such information in a convenient and accessible form.29 
Like many major breaks with legal precedent or tradition, the decision in Pepper v. Hart 
did not simply materialize out of thin air.  After the Law Commissions’ extended and thoughtful 
treatment, some appellate judges in the 1970s began voicing doubts as to the ongoing basis for a 
rigid rule of non-admissibility.  A judge in one case advocated reliance on Hansard for the 
purpose of identifying the mischief at which a law was aimed.30 Lord Denning in the Court of 
Appeal went further, citing Hansard to help interpret and apply the statutory words under 
review.31 In the course of his opinion, Lord Denning lamented that too often judges “grope 
about in the dark for the meaning of an Act” because they are denied access to what is said in 
 
25 See Millar v. Taylor, supra note 17, at 2332 (giving as reason for refusing to consider parliamentary proceedings 
“That history [of changes a bill underwent in the House where it was first debated and approved] is not known to the 
other house, or to the sovereign”). 
26 See The Official Report pp. 2-3, Fact Sheet G17, House of Commons Information Office (revised 2003), available 
at www.parliament.uk/factsheets; Vogenauer supra note 3, at 631. 
27 See Beswick v. Beswick [1968] A.C. 58, 74 (Lord Reid); Bennion, supra note 23, at 143. 
28 The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, The Interpretation of Statutes, Law Commission No. 21 
and Scottish Law Commission No. 11, 31-32 (1969). 
29 Id. at 36. 
30 Race Relations Board v. Dockers’ Labour Club & Institute [1976] A.C. 285, 299 (Lord Simon). 
31 Davis v. Johnson, [1979] A.C. 264, 276-77 (CA) (Lord Denning). 
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Parliament.32 He added that “[a]lthough it may shock the purists” there was nothing to stop 
judges from consulting the debates on their own and gleaning guidance from them, something he 
himself “confessed” to having done on numerous occasions.33 Upon further appeal, the House of 
Lords disagreed with Lord Denning’s position and re-affirmed the exclusionary rule,34 but the 
debate was becoming more open. 
 In the years immediately preceding Pepper, the Law Lords recognized certain limited 
exceptions to the exclusionary rule.  One involved consideration of a government minister’s 
policy statement to Parliament explaining how the Government proposed to implement its broad 
statutory authority in a specific setting.35 The parliamentary statement was deemed relevant in 
determining whether the minister had unlawfully exceeded his powers under the Act.36 Another 
exception involved interpretation of delegated or secondary legislation—known as statutory 
instruments—designed to carry out  requirements under European Community law.37 The Law 
Lords relied on the Hansard account of government explanations and member criticisms as an 
aid to determining Parliament’s intent in approving the regulations,38 although in doing so they 
observed that such delegated legislation was not subject to the same parliamentary processes of 
consideration and amendment that a Bill would face.39 
These fairly modest inroads were followed, in November 1992, by the sea change of 
Pepper v. Hart, holding that reference to Hansard would henceforth be permitted as an aid to the 
 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 337 (Viscount Dilhorne), 349-50 (Lord Scarman).  See also S.G.G. Edgar, CRAIES ON STATUTE LAW 128-29 
(Sweet & Maxwell 7th ed. 1971) (summarizing traditional position excluding debates in Parliament). 
35 See Brind v. Sec’y of State the Home Dept. [1991] 1 All Eng. Rep. 720.  The decision addressed the 
Government’s policy directing broadcast media to ban television or radio appearances by persons representing 
certain proscribed terrorist organizations. 
36 See id. at 723-24 (Lord Bridge), 729-30 (Lord Ackner). 
37 See Pickstone v. Freemans plc [1988] 2 All Eng. Rep. 803. 
38 See id. at 806-07 (Lord Keith), 814-15 (Lord Templeman). 
39 See id. at 807 (Lord Keith), 814 (Lord Tempelman). 
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interpretation of primary legislation.  In reaching its decision by a six-to-one majority, the Law 
Lords disavowed contrary holdings and rationales from a number of earlier decisions.40 
B.  The Rule of Pepper 
Pepper v. Hart involved a tax statute; the controversy arose over how to measure the 
taxable fringe benefit received by nine members of the teaching staff at an independent boys’ 
school.41 Pursuant to a concessionary fee scheme operated by the school, the teachers’ sons were 
educated at a charge of one-fifth the fees paid by members of the public.  The school was not 
filled to capacity, and its marginal costs in educating these additional boys were very low—
minimal amounts for food, laundry, school supplies, etc.42 The boys’ parents argued that they 
owed no taxes at all, because the value of the fringe benefit they received was less than the one-
fifth fees they had paid.  The Crown, on behalf of the Inspector of Taxes, maintained that the 
expense incurred by the school was simply the average cost of its providing for the education of 
all enrolled children; this average cost well exceeded the one-fifth fees paid by the nine teaching 
staff, and thus taxes were owed on the difference.43 
The Finance Act of 1976 provided that the proper measure of a taxable benefit was the 
“cash equivalent of the benefit.”44 Another section of the Act defined that phrase as “an amount 
equal to the cost of the benefit,” but its further textual elaborations might plausibly be viewed as 
meaning either an employer’s marginal cost or its average cost.45 At the conclusion of oral 
 
40 See Pepper [1993] 1 All Eng. Rep. at 60-69 (abandoning rule set forth in Beswick v. Beswick [1968], Black-
Clawson International [1975], Davis v. Johnson [1979] and Fothergill v. Monarch Airlines Ltd [1980]). 
41 See Pepper [1993] 1 All Eng. Rep. at 42. 
42 See id. at 54. 
43 See id. at 54. 
44 Finance Act, 1976, c. 2, §61. 
45 Section 63(1) defines “cash equivalent of the benefit chargeable to tax under section 61” as “an amount equal to 
the cost of the benefit” (emphasis added), arguably suggesting the marginal cost to the employer of providing the 
benefit.  Section 63(2) adds that “the cost of a benefit…includes a proper proportion of any expense relating partly 
to the benefit and partly to other matters” (emphasis added), suggesting perhaps more strongly the average cost to 
the employer of educating each child under its supervision. 
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argument, the Law Lords by a four-to-one margin determined that the text should be construed in 
favor of the Government.46 They reasoned that “cost of the benefit”—in traditional accountancy 
terms and as a matter of ordinary meaning—was properly understood in this setting to signify the 
average cost of providing the same educational benefit to all boys in the school.47 
Before the decision issued, however, it was brought to the Law Lords’ attention that in 
the course of debate on the passage of the 1976 Act, the Financial Secretary to the Treasury had 
responded to questions in the House of Commons on virtually the precise circumstances 
presented in the pending appeal.48 The Law Lords then held a second hearing before an enlarged 
panel of seven judges, addressed to the question of whether it was appropriate for the court to 
depart from its exclusionary rule and if so whether Hansard provided any guidance in deciding 
the instant case.49 The court answered yes on both counts. 
 Lord Browne-Wilkinson authored the leading speech.  His primary reason for modifying 
the rule on Hansard was that to do so would further the court’s “duty…to give effect to the 
intention of Parliament.”50 Recognizing that ambiguities in enacted text were inevitable, Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson noted that in many if not most cases the parliamentary materials would shed 
no light on the interpretive matter facing the court.  But in those few instances where statements 
made during debates provide “a clear indication of what Parliament intended in using those 
 
46 See Pepper [1993] 1 All Eng. Rep. at 42 (listing five Lords of Appeal in Ordinary who heard the initial 1991 
appeal); id. at 52 (remarks of Lord Griffiths, describing himself as “in a judicial minority of one at the end of the 
first hearing”); id. at 52 (remarks of Lord Oliver, describing majority’s determination to dismiss taxpayers’ appeal at 
end of first hearing).  
47 See id. at 52 (remarks of Lord Oliver, justifying his initial position); id. at 72 (remarks of Lord Browne-
Wilkinson, justifying his initial position). 
48 See id. at 54-55 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson). 
49 See id. at 55 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson).  See also note 6 supra (discussing use of larger panels for especially 
important issues). 
50 See Pepper [1993] 1 All Eng. Rep. at 64. 
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words,” it would be wrong for courts to “blind themselves” to such evidence and risk adopting a 
construction that would thwart rather than enforce Parliament’s true design.51 
In addition to this argument based in effect on strengthening parliamentary supremacy, 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson relied on more pragmatic considerations as well.  One was the illogical 
nature of current legal distinctions regarding admissibility.  Courts had long been permitted to 
examine White Papers and commission reports to help ascertain the mischief which a law aimed 
to correct; a ministerial statement made in Parliament was no less authoritative in this regard.52 
Likewise, the Law Lords had invited courts to rely on ministerial statements made when 
introducing statutory instruments that could not be amended by Parliament; such statements were 
not sensibly distinguishable from ministers’ introductory statements explaining primary 
legislation, much of which is never amended prior to passage.53 A further pragmatic concern 
was that the rule against admissibility was impeding fairness and transparency in the litigation 
process.  It prevented parties from addressing the courts on parliamentary materials even though 
many distinguished judges had admitted they were peeking at Hansard and drawing their own 
inferences as to parliamentary intent.54 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson went on to consider and discuss the various practical and 
constitutional objections relied on by courts in the past to justify the exclusionary rule.  He 
concluded that concerns over library access and lack of satisfactory indexing for Hansard were 
overstated; similar concerns had been voiced with respect to the growing number of statutory 
instruments, but practitioners were coping with those materials even if at some expense.55 
51 See id. Relatedly, Lord Browne-Wilkinson also noted the importance of “the purposive approach to construction 
now [widely] adopted by the courts in order to give effect to the true intentions of the legislature.”  Id. at 65. 
52 See id. at 65. 
53 Id. (drawing analogy to Pickstone v. Freemans, discussed supra at notes 37-39 and accompanying text). 
54 Id. at 66. 
55 Id. 
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Concerns that lawyers and judges lacked the sophistication to sift and assess the weight of 
various parliamentary statements also were deemed exaggerated.56 Although there would be 
research costs from combing through Hansard in hopes of finding clear evidence as to what 
Parliament intended, these costs were easily over-estimated, especially given the limited nature 
of what would be admissible under the court’s new standard.57 
The majority also made relatively short work of the two leading constitutional defenses 
for excluding Hansard.  With respect to the Article 9 argument, Lord Browne-Wilkinson 
reasoned that it stretched language and common sense too far to conclude that the use of Hansard 
for the purpose of construing a statute in a court was a “questioning [of] proceedings in 
parliament.”  Moreover, such a conclusion would then have to apply to all media reports 
reviewing or commenting on what is said in Parliament, an untenable result.58 With regard to the 
separation of powers argument, the majority observed that although statutory words are indeed 
the law, courts rely on a range of extrinsic sources as aids to construction of those words, 
including White Papers and official government reports.  Reliance on parliamentary materials in 
some circumstances as a further means of assisting the court to make its own interpretive 
determination raised no new constitutional question.59 It is noteworthy that the one Lord who 
disagreed with the majority’s decision to eliminate the exclusionary rule had no constitutional 
concerns over this outcome; his reservations were directed only at the cost-related practical 
arguments.60 
56 Id. at 66-67. 
57 Id. at 67.  For discussion of court’s standard, see infra at notes 61-63 and accompanying text.  Lord Griffiths, 
concurring in the result, emphasized that modern technology “greatly facilitates” the retrieval of Hansard materials, 
adding that based on personal experience “it does not take long to recall and assemble the relevant passages in which 
the particular section was dealt with in Parliament, nor does it take long to see if anything relevant was said.”  Id. at 
50.  
58 Id. at 67-68. 
59 Id. at 69. 
60 Id. at 48 (Lord Mackay of Clashfern). 
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Having determined to depart from longstanding precedent, the majority made clear that 
its modification was limited and subject to certain safeguards.  Lord Browne-Wilkinson stated 
that courts should refer to parliamentary materials to aid in statutory construction only if three 
conditions were met.  First, the text in question must be ambiguous or obscure, or its literal 
meaning must lead to an absurdity.61 Even then, judicial reliance would be proper only if the 
parliamentary material was clear either as to the mischief aimed at or the legislative intention 
lying behind the unclear words.62 Finally, in order for such parliamentary statements to be clear, 
they would have to be made by a government minister or other primary proponent of the bill, 
perhaps accompanied by questions or replies from members that provided proper context.63 
The majority was confident that its three part test would constrain counsel’s inclination to 
invoke Hansard, and thereby limit the costs to parties and courts of having to review and analyze 
parliamentary materials.64 To reinforce these limits, Lord-Browne Wilkinson added that 
attempts to introduce parliamentary material which failed to satisfy the three factors should 
trigger an order for costs against the offending party.65 In addition, a Practice Direction was 
issued in 1994, specifying that five working days before a hearing, any party intending to refer to 
Hansard in court must provide the court and all other parties with copies of the Hansard extract 
and a summary of the planned argument based on that extract.66 This direction to counsel, which 
 
61 Id. at 64 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson). 
62 Id. 
63 Id. The three factors are restated id at 69. 
64 Id. at 66-67. 
65 Id. at 67.  In Melluish (Inspector of Taxes) v. BMI Ltd., [1995] 4 All Eng. Rep. 453, 468, (discussed infra at notes 
88-89 and accompanying text), Lord Browne-Wilkinson invoked the need for “appropriate orders as to costs 
wasted” in rejecting government counsel’s effort to rely on Hansard.  It is difficult to know how often the sanction 
has been imposed by lower courts. 
66 Practice Note [1995] 1 All Eng. Rep. 234 (Supreme Court).  This direction was reiterated in 1999 and 2002.  See 
Practice Direction [1999] 1 WLR 1059-60 (CA, Civil Division); Practice Direction [2002] 1 WLR 2870, 2880, 2894 
(Criminal Proceedings).  
16
authorized sanctions for noncompliance, reinforced the judicial view that references to Hansard 
were not to be undertaken lightly. 
 The Pepper majority applied its new test to the 1976 Finance Act and determined that the 
parliamentary material was admissible and highly probative.  Reasoning that the “cost of the 
benefit” language in the law was ambiguous as between an employer’s marginal or average 
cost,67 Lord Browne-Wilkinson proceeded to consider the Financial Secretary’s statements in 
Parliament.  The statutory section at issue had sparked concern among members because of its 
possible impact on concessionary travel benefits regularly bestowed on airline and railway 
employees.  Existing government practice had been not to tax such benefits on an average cost 
basis.  The Secretary announced at the start of a standing committee meeting in May 1976 
(reported in Hansard) his withdrawal of a proposed subsection that would have taxed in-house 
benefits at the price paid by the public.68 The Secretary offered several policy reasons for this 
change; he also responded to various member inquiries by explaining that the marginal cost 
approach would continue to apply for such benefits, and he repeated his determination to leave 
the status quo unaltered in a government press release issued that day.69 
The following month at a further committee meeting on the bill, a member asked the 
Secretary whether the government’s earlier language modification would apply to concessionary 
fee arrangements for children of staff at private schools.  The Secretary responded affirmatively, 
stating the government’s change meant that “now the [educational] benefit will be assessed on 
 
67 Pepper, [1993] 1 All Eng. Rep. at 69-70. 
68 Id. at 57-58, 70.  See note 23 supra, discussing Hansard’s inclusion of all standing committee proceedings. 
69 Id. at 58-59.  The policy reasons presented by the Secretary were (i) the injustice to taxpayers given the large 
difference between the actual cost of providing the additional services and the amount of benefit that would be taxed 
to the recipients; (ii) the resultant chill on use of such services by employees, to the likely detriment of all parties; 
and (iii) difficulties of enforcement and administration.  Id. at 58. 
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the cost to the employer, which would be very small indeed.”70 There was no further relevant 
debate on the language prior to enactment. 
 For Lord Browne-Wilkinson, this legislative history was both clear and persuasive.  
Committee members had repeatedly pressed the government for guidance on the in-house 
benefits matter following the change in text, the minister’s statements were directly responsive 
and unambiguous, and the matter was not raised again after the extended committee discussion.  
Under these circumstances, the majority reasoned that it was proper “to attribute to Parliament as 
a whole the same intention as that repeatedly voiced by the Financial Secretary.”71 
The factual setting in Pepper, where the government argued in court for an interpretation 
it had expressly disavowed when promoting the bill in Parliament, might have led the Law Lords 
to adopt a narrower estoppel-type justification for the relevance of materials found in Hansard.  
Under this approach, courts would have been given access to Hansard only in cases where the 
government’s denial in court of a prior officially endorsed position amounted to fundamental 
unfairness.  Counsel for the taxpayers at one point came close to embracing such a rationale,72 
and some Law Lords have subsequently tried to limit Pepper’s scope based on this theory.73 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s opinion, however, does not rely on the injustice of the government’s 
reversing its position.  His rationale for imputing collective intent is broader than that:  
irrespective of the equities involved, “what is persuasive in this case is a consistent series of 
answers given by the minister, after opportunities for taking advice from his officials, all of 
 
70 Id. at 60. 
71 Id. at 71. 
72 Pepper [1993] A.C. at 598 (reciting argument of appellant’s counsel at second hearing, referring to the Financial 
Secretary’s special expertise on complex tax measures and the public’s right to rely on his explicit and official 
representations as to a bill’s meaning when arranging their financial affairs). 
73 See notes 102-106, infra, and accompanying text. 
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which point the same way and which were not withdrawn or varied prior to the enactment of the 
bill.”74 
C.  Developments Since Pepper 
 In the years following Pepper, the Law Lords have expressed a range of reactions in 
considering how and how often to make use of parliamentary materials.  The responses by the 
court as a whole may be divided into three periods.  An initial interval of fairly frequent 
references to Hansard was followed by a more muted span in which doubts surfaced as to the 
benefits of the Pepper approach.  The third and current period involves more open disagreement 
among the Law Lords themselves.  Although several Law Lords have expressed regrets about the 
door that Pepper opened, most appear to remain convinced of its wisdom and the court’s 
references to Hansard have increased in the years since 2000. 
1.  Initial Enthusiasm 
Within the first fifteen months after Pepper came down, nine House of Lords decisions 
invoked parliamentary materials to help explain the meaning of text.75 Given that the Law Lords 
decided between forty and fifty cases per year in this period,76 and that some cases did not 
involve matters of statutory construction, the nine instances qualified as a surge of interest in 
legislative history.  Certain decisions reflected tangential use of Hansard,77 but often the judges 
 
74 Pepper, [1993] 1 All Eng. Rep. at 66.  Lord Bridge in his brief concurring opinion did raise the estoppel issue, 
referring to the “acute question as to whether it could possibly be right to give effect to taxing legislation which the 
Financial Secretary…had, in effect, assured the House of Commons it was not intended to impose.”  Id. at 49.  The 
importance of this alternative rationale is further addressed infra in Part IC. 
75 The nine decisions were issued between November 1992 and February 1994.  All cases invoking Hansard from 
1992 to 2006 were identified by using the following search strategy on Lexis:  “Hansard” or “HC debates” or “HL 
debates” or “Pepper” or “HC official report” or “HL official report.” 
76 The House of Lords webpage includes a complete list of Law Lords decisions starting in November 1996.  A 
Lexis search indicates that the Law Lords issued forty-five decisions in 1993 and fifty-one in 1994. 
77 See, e.g., Reg. v. Preston, [1993] 4 All Eng. Rep. 638, 650; Scher v. Policyholders Prot. Bd., [1993] 4 All Eng. 
Rep. 840, 852; Attorney General v. Assoc. Newspapers Ltd., [1994] 1 All Eng. Rep. 556, 566. 
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found the previously forbidden fruit to be influential in resolving an interpretive controversy.78 
For instance, Lord Griffiths in one decision invoked Hansard to establish that an earlier court had 
misapprehended Parliament’s true intent with respect to a statute of limitations provision.79 And 
Lord Bridge, faced with a language gap regarding appellate courts’ authority to order payment of 
attorneys’ costs, remarked that “Happily our new freedom to refer to Hansard solves the 
mystery.”80 
During this initial period, the Law Lords were less than rigorous in applying Pepper’s 
three-part test.  On a number of occasions, the judges invoked parliamentary material as 
admissible and relevant without discussing at all the basis for concluding that the Pepper factors 
had been met.81 Further, the court’s analysis often indicated that Hansard was being referenced 
or relied on even though the Pepper factors had not been fulfilled.  Thus, the judges invoked 
Hansard as support for what they independently understood to be the meaning of the text.82 Such 
confirmatory references may be perfectly reasonable, but Pepper had declared there could be no 
usage at all unless the text was found to be truly ambiguous or obscure.  83 
2.  The Bloom Fades 
From early 1994 through 1999, the court’s usage of Hansard in statutory interpretation 
cases notably diminished.  Over a period of close to six years in which the Law Lords decided 
 
78 See, e.g., Stubbings v. Webb, [1993] 1 All Eng. Rep. 322, 329; Reg. v. Warwickshire C.C. Ex p. Johnson, [1993] 
A.C. 583, 588, 591; Holden & Co. v. C.P.S., [1994] 1 A.C. 22, 37; Chief Adjudication Officer v. Foster, [1993] 1 
All Eng. Rep. 705, 715-17. 
79 See Stubbings [1993] 1 All Eng. Rep. at 329. 
80 See Holden [1994] 1 A.C. at 37. 
81 See, e.g., Warwickshire, [1993] A.C. at 587-88, 591-92 (Lord Roskill); Stubbings, [1993] 1 All Eng. Rep. at 329, 
(Lord Griffiths).  See also Associated Newspapers Ltd., [1994] 1 All Eng. Rep. at 566 (Lord Lowry) (giving no 
reason for decision not to admit parliamentary materials under Pepper). 
82 See Warwickshire, [1993] A.C. at 592 (Lord Roskill), Stubbings [1993] 1 All Eng. Rep. at 329 (Lord Griffiths); 
Chief Adjudication Officer [1993] 1 All Eng. Rep. at 717 (Lord Bridge); Scher [1993] 4 All Eng. Rep. at 852 (Lord 
Mustill).  See generally David Miers, Taxing Perks and Interpreting Statutes: Pepper v. Hart, 56 MOD. L. REV. 695, 
705-06 (1993). 
83 The Law Lords also referenced Hansard statements from ordinary members without explaining whether or how 
these legislators were serving in a leadership role comparable to a government minister.  See Stubbings [1993] 1 All 
Eng. Rep. at 329 (Lord Griffiths); Chief Adjudication Officer, [1993] 1 All Eng. Rep. at 715-17 (Lord Bridge). 
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roughly fifty cases per year, the judges invoked parliamentary materials in their opinions in a 
mere thirteen decisions, barely more than twice each calendar year.  Apart from the decline in 
citations to Hansard, there are further indications that the Law Lords had become somewhat less 
enamored of the new interpretive resource. 
 On a number of occasions, attorneys’ legal contentions relying on parliamentary 
materials were simply ignored in the opinions of the court.84 Counsel may well have been 
encouraged to include Hansard materials in their argument by the Law Lords’ initial burst of 
enthusiasm, and the court’s silence would not alone be sufficient to establish judicial misgivings.  
In some instances, however, the Law Lords went further than silence, voicing concern at what 
they regarded as excessive efforts to promote Hansard.  Thus, Lord Hobhouse in his concurring 
opinions referred briefly to counsel’s unsuccessful attempt at reliance on Hansard, “purportedly 
under Pepper”85 and also criticized a lower court judge by name for taking account of 
parliamentary debates when Pepper gave “no warrant for such an approach.”86 
More frequently in this period, the Law Lords considered but dismissed arguments 
relying on Hansard because one or more of Pepper’s three factors had not been met.  In 
particular, the court several times determined that the legislative history being cited was itself 
unclear or not sufficiently definitive.87 In 1995, Lord Browne-Wilkinson—the author of 
Pepper—complained about counsel overreaching in their introduction of Hansard.  He criticized 
the government in a tax case for relying on parliamentary materials directed to a separate tax 
provision than the one under judicial review, adding that to seek guidance from a wholly distinct 
 
84 See, e.g., Deposit Prot. Bd. v. Dalia, [1994] 2 A.C. 367, 372-73 (summarizing arguments of counsel); In Re C (a 
Minor), [1997] A.C. 489, 492 (same); O’Rourke v. Camden London Borough Council, [1998] A.C. 188, 190 (same); 
Reg. v. Home Secretary Ex p. Stafford, [1999] 2 A.C. 38, 41 (same). 
85 R. v. Director of Public Prosecutions Ex p. Kebiline, [1999] 4 All Eng. Rep. 801, 851.  
86 Fitzpatrick v. Sterling Housing Assoc. Ltd. [1994] 4 All Eng. Rep. 705, 745. 
87 See Melluish (Inspector of Taxes) v. BMI Ltd., [1995] 4 All Eng. Rep. 453, 468 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson); Sec’y 
of State v. Remilien, [1998] 1 All Eng. Rep. 129, 146-47 (Lord Hoffman); Reg. v. Bow Street Magistrate Ex p. 
Pinochet, [1998] 4 All Eng. Rep. 897, 931 (Lord Lloyd). 
21
legislative proceeding was “an improper use of the relaxed rule introduced by Pepper.”88 Noting 
that such efforts to widen the permissible category of parliamentary materials offered no 
assistance but risked considerable expense and delay, Lord Browne-Wilkinson invited an 
appropriate order as to costs wasted in such settings.89 
Notwithstanding their concerns that counsel were at times pushing the “relaxed rule” of 
Pepper too far, the Law Lords continued to rely on Hansard materials to help them resolve 
disputes over statutory meaning.90 Moreover, the court on occasion sent mixed signals even 
when formally disavowing reliance on Hansard.  In a 1997 decision, the leading speech observed 
that certain parliamentary materials were not admissible because the text itself was 
unambiguous, but then proceeded to refer to them for informational background purposes.91 
Within the academic community, the Law Lords’ decision to admit parliamentary 
materials, which had been greeted with skepticism from the start,92 continued to generate 
negative reactions.  Academic critics in the late 1990s reiterated that separation of powers 
principles should preclude judicial reliance on statements by members of the executive or 
legislative branches interpreting the law they were enacting.93 These critics also challenged the 
 
88 Melluish, [1995] 4 All Eng. Rep. at 468. 
89 Id. 
90 See, e.g., Reg. v. Preddy, [1996] 3 All Eng. Rep. 481, 487-88 (Lord Goff); Lowsley v. Forbes, [1998] 3 All Eng. 
Rep. 897, 905-06 (Lord Lloyd); Reg. v. Oxfordshire C.C., Ex p. Sunningwell P.C., [1999] 3 All Eng. Rep. 384, 393 
(Lord Hofffman). 
91 Inland Revenue Comm’rs v. Willoughby, [1997] 4 All Eng. Rep. 65, 69-71 (Lord Nolan). 
92 See Styles, supra note 3; Baker, supra note 3; Miers, supra note 82. 
93 See, e.g., Geoffrey Marshall, Hansard and the Interpretation of Statutes, in THE LAW IN PARLIAMENT 139, 153-54 
(Dawn Oliver and Gavin Drewry eds. 1998); Robert Summers, Interpreting Statutes in Great Britain and the United 
States:  Should Courts Consider Materials of Legislative History? in THE LAW, POLITICS, AND THE CONSTITUTION:
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF GEOFFREY MARSHALL 222, 231-32 (David Butler et al. eds. 1998).  See also David 
Robertson, JUDICIAL DISCRETION IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS 183 (1999) (expressing concern that Pepper allows courts 
to rely on ministerial statements undermining civil liberties when the text being “explained” would not be viewed as 
accomplishing such a result).  Academic criticism on constitutional grounds has not yet abated.  See generally 
Aileen Kavanaugh, Pepper v. Hart and Matters of Constitutional Principle, 121 L.Q. REV. 98 (2005). 
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notion that statements by government ministers could reflect the intention of Parliament, 
insisting that collective intent was derivable only from the words of the text.94 
By the late 1990s, some Law Lords were publicly questioning the benefits of the new 
interpretive approach.  In a 1997 lecture, Lord Hoffman expressed sympathy in principle for 
judicial use of Hansard both because it could estop the executive from abandoning interpretive 
representations made before Parliament and because a high profile ministerial statement from 
which no member dissented was at times the best evidence of what Parliament must have 
understood it was approving.95 Yet Lord Hoffman was doubtful whether the time and money 
spent on Hansard research was justified given how seldom it yielded truly probative results.96 In 
a 1999 address, Lord Millett was more blunt, referring to Pepper as a “regrettable decision” in 
practical terms and also as a matter of constitutional principle.  He discussed the impropriety of 
relying on unenacted intentions as well as the largely unproductive costs of Hansard-related 
research.97 Lord Millett added, however, that while he objected to judicial references to the 
course of proceedings in Parliament, he endorsed “the practice of the American Congress of 
publishing detailed explanatory memoranda” that were not “made in the heat of debate”98; this 
presumably refers to our committee reports. 
 Beginning in 2000, the concerns that had been voiced extrajudicially became part of an at 
times heated dialogue aired through the judicial opinions of the Law Lords. 
3.  Full-scale Debate 
94 See Marshall, supra note 93, at 151-53, Summers, supra note 93, at 232-33, 235-36. 
95 Lord Hoffman, supra note 4, at 669. 
96 Id. at 668.  See also Lord Steyn, Interpretation:  Legal Texts and Their Landscape, in THE CLIFFORD CHANCE 
MILLENNIUM LECTURES: THE COMING TOGETHER OF THE COMMON LAW AND THE CIVIL LAW 79, 87-88 (Basil 
Markesinis ed. 2000). 
97 Lord Millett, supra note 4, at 110. 
98 Id. 
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An opening salvo from Lord Steyn, a member of the Law Lords since 1994, focused the 
terms of the debate.  In his Hart Lecture delivered at Oxford in May 2000, Lord Steyn assumed a 
lead critic’s role comparable to Justice Scalia.  He acknowledged that he initially had supported 
the court’s majority opinion but declared that he had come to regard its current application as 
indefensible primarily on separation of powers grounds.99 
Lord Steyn did not propose to overrule Pepper, but instead to limit its scope.  He believed 
Hansard could be cited by a court to identify the mischief at which a law was aimed, for the 
reasons given by Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Pepper.100 He also believed Hansard should be 
relied on by courts to prevent the executive from repudiating prior representations made to 
Parliament as to the meaning of statutory text—developing the estoppel argument suggested 
earlier by Lord Hoffman.101 What he renounced, however, was the broader rationale for citing to 
Hansard:  it was “constitutionally unacceptable…to treat the intentions of the government as 
revealed in debates as reflecting the will of Parliament.”102 Lord Steyn has presented his 
proposed limitations on Pepper in a number of judicial opinions.  He has invoked parliamentary 
materials to help determine the mischief that the statute is intended to correct,103 while 
maintaining that ministerial statements in Hansard should be used only to identify such mischief 
or as an estoppel against the executive, not as evidence reflecting what Parliament meant by 
particular statutory words or phrases.104 
99 See id. at 62-68.  Lord Steyn dismissed the Article 9 constitutional argument invoked by some academics (see 
supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text) as “transparently weak.”  He repeated his previously expressed pragmatic 
concern that resort to Hansard was an “expensive luxury in our legal system,” and also restated the by-now familiar 
arguments against there being any discernible “intention” of Parliament outside of the text.  
100 See id. at 68, 70 referring to analogy between Hansard and White Papers or commission reports in this regard. 
101 See id. at 67, 70.  Cf. text accompanying note 95 supra.
102 Id. at 68. 
103 See Reg. v. Soneji [2005] UKHL 49, [2005] 4 All Eng. Rep. 321, 324-25; Lesotho Highlands Dev. Auth. v. 
Impreglio [2005] UKHL 43, [2006] 1 A.C. 221, ____. 
104 See McDonnell v. Congregation of Christian Bros. Trs. [2003] UKHL 63, [2004] 1 All Eng. Rep. 641, 655-56 
(concurring opinion); Jackson v. Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56, [2005] 4 All Eng. Rep. 1253, 1285 (concurring 
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In the years since 2000, a number of Law Lords have expressed disappointment over 
what they view as the scant benefits and considerable costs associated with the use of Hansard.  
The court has been regularly attentive to Pepper’s three factors, often finding Hansard materials 
inappropriate because ministerial statements were inconclusive105 and sometimes rejecting 
Hansard because the text itself was clear.106 Lord Hoffman in 2002 was more outspoken, 
declaring that based on ten years of experience under Pepper, the dissenting judge in that 
decision “has turned out to be the better prophet” with respect to how rarely Hansard is helpful 
as against how heavily counsel invest in mining the “large spoil heap of [parliamentary] 
material.”107 
Apart from giving vent to practical frustrations, the Law Lords have identified some 
additional limits on the scope of Pepper. In Reg. v. Secretary of State for the Environment Ex p. 
Spath Holme,108 decided in December 2000, the issue was whether a statutory power to restrict 
rent increases could be exercised by the Secretary solely in order to control inflation; if so, then 
controlling rents for a different reason (to mitigate hardship for a class of tenants) was ultra 
vires.109 The Court of Appeal had consulted Hansard to help determine that the rent-restricting 
powers had been enacted as part of government counterinflationary policy and therefore the 
 
opinion).  While Lord Steyn tendered his estoppel argument as a preferred modification of Pepper, Lord Hope has 
adopted the same argument as embodying the proper understanding of that decision itself.  See Reg. v. Sec’y of 
State for the Environment Ex p. Spath Holme [2000] UKHL ____, [2001] 1 All Eng. Rep. 195, 226-27 (concurring 
opinion); Wilson v. First County Trust Ltd. [2003] UKHL 40, [2003] 4 All Eng. Rep. 97, 130-31 (concurring 
opinion).  This seems manifestly incorrect as a reading of the majority opinion in Pepper (see text accompanying 
notes 72-74 supra), although Lord Hope’s position has not been explicitly rejected in subsequent decisions.   
105 See, e.g., Ex p. Spath Holme, [2001] 1 All Eng. Rep. at 211-12 (Lord Bingham), 219 (Lord Nicholls); Robinson 
v. Sec’y of State for Northern Ireland [2002] N. Ir. L. R. 390, 400 (Lord Bingham), 404 (Lord Hoffmann); Reg. 
(Quintavelle) v. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Auth., [2005] 2 All Eng. Rep. 555, 564 (Lord Hoffman). 
106 See, e.g., Aston Cantlow v. Wallbank [2003] UKHL 37, [2003] 3 All Eng. Rep. 1213, 1225 (Lord Hope); Ex p. 
Spath Holme, [2001] 1 All Eng. Rep. at 212 (Lord Bingham). 
107 Robinson, [2002] N. Ir. L. R. at 405.  See also P v. Nat’l Assn. of Schoolmasters [2003] UKHL 8, [2003] 1 All 
Eng. Rep. 993, 1004 (Lord Hoffmann) (referring to “the usual hopeless attempt to obtain guidance from 
Parliamentary debates under the rule in Pepper”). 
108 [2000] UKHL ____, [2001] 1 All Eng. Rep. 195. 
109 Id. at 198. 
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Secretary’s use of them for another reason was unlawful.110 The Law Lords reversed, construing 
the relevant text to hold that there were no inflation-related limitations on the Secretary’s 
authority to impose a rent ceiling.111 
More important for Hansard purposes, the lead opinion went on to distinguish Pepper,
which had turned on the meaning of a particular statutory phrase, from the instant case which 
involved the scope of the government’s discretionary powers conferred by statute.  Lord 
Bingham, who delivered the leading speech, reasoned that because such powers are inevitably 
open-ended, a minister’s contribution in Parliament is very unlikely to resolve doubts about all or 
even most future uses of these powers.112 He concluded—echoing to some extent Lord Steyn’s 
estoppel rationale—that unless a ministerial statement or response gave “a categorical assurance 
to Parliament that a power would not be used in a given situation, such that Parliament could be 
taken to have legislated on that basis,” ministerial statements addressed to the scope of a 
discretionary power were inadmissible.113 
The Law Lords announced a further restraint on judicial use of Hansard in Wilson v. First 
County Trust Ltd.,114 issued in July 2003.  That case involved whether a 1974 consumer credit 
statute was compatible with the European Convention of Human Rights, which had been 
integrated into British law pursuant to the 1998 Human Rights Act.115 As part of its review, the 
 
110 [2000] 1 All Eng. Rep. 884, 899-900. 
111 See note 108 supra at 219 (Lord Nicholls), 211-12 (Lord Bingham), 226-27 (Lord Hope), 219-23 (Lord Cooke), 
233 (Lord Hutton). 
112 See id. at 211-12 (Lord Bingham). 
113 See id at 212.  See also id. at 227 (Lord Hope) (contending that Pepper should be understood to admit Hansard 
materials only on an estoppel rationale, and endorsing Lord Bingham’s use of that rationale here).  But see id. at 
218-19 (Lord Nicholls), 219-23 (Lord Cooke) (contending that ministerial statements addressed to scope of a 
discretionary power are admissible with varying degrees of persuasive weight.
114 [2003] 4 All Eng. Rep. 97. 
115 See id. at 109 (Lord Nicholls).  Section 3 of the Human Rights Act provides that “so far as it is possible to do 
so…[all domestic] legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with Convention rights” 
(emphasis added).  This parliamentary mandate, akin in some respects to our constitutional avoidance canon, has 
generated disagreement among the Law Lords; it has been interpreted by some members to apply even if there is no 
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court considered whether Hansard materials could be consulted in order to help determine 
compatibility. 
 Lord Nicholls, authoring the leading speech, concluded that courts were allowed to 
invoke parliamentary materials in this setting but only to a limited extent.  He noted that 
evaluating the effect of domestic legislation to ascertain whether British law was incompatible 
with European Convention rights is a different enterprise from directly interpreting and applying 
such legislation.116 If the domestic law infringes on a convention right, a court must determine 
whether the law’s policy objective presumptively justifies such an infringement given the nature 
of the convention right, and also whether the means employed by the domestic law to achieve its 
policy objective are proportionate in terms of the adverse effect.117 Lord Nicholls concluded that 
when identifying a law’s policy objective or assessing its proportionality, a court is permitted to 
consult Hansard to seek “enlightenment on the nature and extent of the social problem (the 
‘mischief’) at which the legislation is aimed,” but not to explore statutory meaning in further 
respects.118 
Lord Nicholls likened this approved use of Hansard “as a source of background 
information” to other “innocuous” uses previously countenanced under Pepper; he referred 
specifically to the use of ministerial statements that help identify the background when 
construing domestic statutes or that assist a court in understanding government policy when 
 
ambiguity in the text being construed.  See, e.g. R. v. A. [2001] UKHL 25, [2001] 3 All Eng. Rep. 1, 17 (Lord 
Steyn). 
116 Wilson, [2003] 4 All Eng. Rep. at 112. 
117 Id. The Human Rights Act allows British courts to make declarations of incompatibility but not to set aside Acts 
of Parliament that are inconsistent with Convention rights.  For discussion of legal developments on compatibility 
under the 1998 Act, which became effective in October 2000, see Ingman, supra note 6, at 306-312; Zander, supra 
note 6, at 184-189; Nicholas Bamforth, Courts in a Multi-Layered Constitution in PUBLIC LAW IN A MULTI-
LAYERED CONSTITUTION 277, 290-301 (Nicholas Bamforth & Peter Leyland eds. 2003).  
118 Wilson,[2003] 4 All Eng. Rep. at 118-19. 
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reviewing contested agency decisions.119 But Lord Nicholls added that beyond such reliance for 
background information purposes, Hansard was not relevant to the issues a court must resolve in 
compatibility cases.  In particular, a statute’s proportionality was to be addressed based on its 
text, not the quality of reasons advanced by its proponents or the state of mind of ministers 
debating its merits.120 
The decisions since 2000 thus disclose a range of practical and conceptual misgivings 
associated with reliance on Hansard.  Judges have complained about the disproportionate 
burdens on clients, counsel, and courts from having to sift through parliamentary materials.  
Individual opinions also have articulated several possible grounds for limiting Hansard’s 
admissibility when construing the meaning of statutory text.  These include refusing to consider 
ministerial statements that address the scope of a discretionary government power, or that bear 
on incompatibility under the Human Rights Acts, or that extend beyond estopping the 
government from contradicting in court what it previously said in Parliament. 
Notwithstanding such doubts, however, the Law Lords have by no means abandoned the 
basic rule of Pepper. In the years from 2002 through 2005, Hansard materials were discussed by 
one or more panel members in forty out of some 250 decided cases—an average of ten per 
 
119 Id. at 117.  On the second “routine” use of Hansard, the court cited its earlier decision in Brind as an apt example; 
see discussion supra at text accompany notes 35-36. 
120 Id. at 119.  As part of his analysis, Lord Nicholls cited with approval Lord Steyn’s Hart lecture, focusing on the 
“conceptual and constitutional difficulties” of treating the government’s intentions revealed in debate as reflecting 
the will of Parliament.  Id. at 117. 
A third possible limitation on the use of Hansard was raised by Lord Bingham in another case decided in 
2003.  See McDonnell v. Congregation of Christian Bros. Trs. [2003] UKHL 63, [2004] 1 All Eng. Rep. 641, 653.  
In considering the meaning of a 1963 statute setting limitation periods for various claims, the Law Lords were 
referred to Hansard materials that had been off limits at the time (prior to 1992) the court originally had construed 
the provision at issue.  Lord Bingham opined that absent exceptional circumstances it would be inappropriate for the 
Law Lords to invoke Hansard in order to depart from any authoritative statutory ruling rendered prior to Pepper.
See id. at 653.  This statement, however, seems unpersuasive given that the Law Lords in a unanimous 1993 
decision had relied on Hansard to overrule an authoritative 1964 ruling by the Court of Appeal.  See Stubbings,
[1993] 1 All Eng. at 328-29 (Lord Griffiths).  Despite his reservation as to the admissibility of Hansard in the 
McDonnell case, Lord Bingham went on to consider Hansard in his opinion, finding the parliamentary materials 
inconclusive on the issue presented.  See also, Vogenauer, supra note 3, at 651-52 (expressing doubts that Lord 
Bingham’s view carries any authority). 
28
calendar year and roughly one-sixth of the court’s decisions.  There are a number of occasions 
where Hansard was invoked for one of the purposes labeled “innocuous” in Wilson: to 
understand agency implementations of government policy that are subject to judicial review121 or 
to identify the background mischief at which a statute is aimed.122 Still the largest single number 
of decisions involve reference to Hansard to shed light on the meaning of possibly inconclusive 
statutory words or phrases.123 
A recent broad-based discussion of Pepper and its applications took place in Reg. 
(Jackson) v. Attorney General,124 decided in October 2005, in which nine Lords of Appeal in 
Ordinary participated.  This case indicates that some Law Lords remain willing to apply Pepper 
in its more controversial sense, although certainly not Lord Steyn.  Jackson involved a challenge 
to the validity of the Hunting Act of 2004.  The statute, which prohibited fox-hunting, had been 
enacted without approval from the House of Lords, consistent with a special procedure for 
bypassing the upper chamber that had been enacted in 1911 and modified in 1949.125 The real 
question presented was whether this special procedure, enacted as section 2(1) of the 1911 law, 
 
121 See, e.g., Reg. (Anderson) v. Home Sec’y [2002] UKHL 46, [2002] 4 All Eng. Rep. 1089, 1104-05 (Lord Steyn); 
Reg. (Saadi) v. Home Sec’y [2002] UKHL 41, [2002] 4 All Eng. Rep. 785, 789 (Lord Slynn); A. v. Home Sec’y 
[2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 3 All Eng. Rep. 169, 187 (Lord Bingham), 226 (Lord Hope). 
122 See, e.g., Ghaidan v. Godin-Mendoza [2004] UKHL 30, [2004] 3 All Eng. Rep. 411, 426-27 (Lord Steyn); Reg. 
v. Soneji [2005] 4 All Eng. Rep. 321; Lesotho Highlands Dev. Auth. v. Impreglio [2005] UKHL 43, [2005] 3 All 
Eng. Rep. 789. 
123 See, e.g., Reg. (Morgan Grenfell Ltd.) v. Special Comm’r [2002] UKHL 21, [2002] 3 All Eng. Rep. 1, 10; 
Mirvahedy, supra note 5, 2 All Eng. Rep. at 438, Jindal Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. Islamic Solidarity Shipping Co. 
[2004] UKHL 49, [2005] 1 All Eng. Rep. 175, 187-88; ReR., (a child) [2005] UKHL 33, [2005] 4 All Eng. Rep. 
433, 437-38; Reg. (Hooper) v. Work and Pensions Sec’y [2005] UKHL 29, [2006] 1 All Eng. Rep. 487, 503.  From 
2002 to 2005, there are eighteen cases in which Hansard is referenced primarily with respect to the meaning of 
statutory words, as opposed to nine cases where the principal focus of Hansard discussion is on identifying the 
background mischief, and fourteen cases where Hansard is primarily invoked to help clarify government policy 
being subjected to judicial review.  A similar distribution applies for cases invoking parliamentary materials in the 
period from 1996 through 2001.  Of the seventeen cases in which Hansard is referenced in one or more judicial 
opinions, nine instances involve primarily the meaning of statutory words, two relate primarily to identifying the 
background mischief, and six involve clarifying government policy subject to judicial review.  These three different 
uses of Hansard are discussed further in Part II.A. and Part III.B., infra.
124 [2005] 4 All Eng. Rep. 1253. 
125 See id. at 1256-57. 
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authorized its own further modification by the Commons alone, as had occurred in 1949.126 The 
Court of Appeal had concluded that the 1911 Act was inconclusive on its face, and had relied 
extensively on parliamentary materials from 1911 to determine that the special procedure could 
lawfully be used to amend itself, and therefore the 1949 Act modifications (as applied in 2004) 
were valid.127 
The Law Lords unanimously upheld the validity of the Hunting Act, dismissing the legal 
challenge to the 1949 law’s enactment.  With respect to reliance on Hansard, Lord Bingham’s 
leading speech concluded that reference to the parliamentary debates and explanatory statements 
from ministers was unnecessary because the 1911 text, properly understood, was neither 
ambiguous nor obscure.128 Lord Bingham did invoke Hansard, however, to establish how the 
record of amendments to section 2(1) considered by the Commons majority helped illuminate the 
meaning of key words in that section.  Specifically, section 2(1) as initially drafted had applied 
its special procedure to “any Public Bill other than a Money Bill.”129 Over a period of four 
months, the Commons considered at least nine amendments proposing to enlarge the class of 
bills to which the new special procedure would not apply.130 Observing that one of these 
amendments was accepted but eight were “uniformly rejected” by the Commons, Lord Bingham 
concluded:  “it is clear from the historical background that Parliament did intend the word “any,” 
subject to the noted exceptions [in text], to mean exactly what it said.”131 
126 See id. at 1256-67.  The 1911 Act, approved by both houses, permitted the House of Commons to bypass the 
House of Lords and enact into law a bill approved by the Commons in three successive sessions, provided the period 
of time between second reading in the first session and passage in the third session was at least two years.  Id. at 
1262-63.  The 1949 Act reduced the number of required Commons sessions approving the bill from three to two and 
the total elapsed time for all considerations from two years to one.  Importantly, the 1949 Act was enacted without 
approval from the House of Lords.  Id. at 1256-57. 
127 See R (Jackson) v. Attorney General [2005] 2 WLR 866, 889-92 (CA). 
128 See note 124 supra at 1271. 
129 See id. at 1264 (emphasis added). 
130 See id. at 1263-64 
131 See id. at 1268. 
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Thus, although Lord Bingham’s lead speech made a point of eschewing reliance on 
ministerial statements offered in the course of parliamentary debate, it relied directly on the 
statute’s drafting history—recorded in Hansard but hardly obvious from the face of the text as 
finally enacted—to help explain the meaning of statutory words.  Lord Nicholls in a concurring 
speech was prepared to go further with Hansard.  He concluded that section 2(1) was sufficiently 
clear, but he also believed the ministerial statements made during parliamentary passage of the 
1911 Act were valuable to confirm the apparent meaning of the text.132 Citing to statements by 
the Prime Minister among others, Lord Nicholls urged open recognition of their relevance in the 
interests of transparency.133 
On the other side, Lord Steyn (also concurring in the result) restated his preference for 
limiting Pepper to situations of estoppel against the government whenever Hansard is being 
invoked to discover the intended meaning of enacted text.134 He was content here, however, to 
rely on Pepper’s three-part test and exclude Hansard references because the text itself was 
clear.135 Lord Walker, Lord Carswell, and Lord Brown opined more briefly that resort to 
Hansard was unnecessary in this case.136 
The latest indication of Pepper’s continuing vitality occurred in July 2006, when three 
members of the Law Lords made a point of observing that reliance on Hansard remains valuable 
as an aid to the construction of text, including text that is not ambiguous or obscure.  In Harding 
 
132 See id. at 1276. 
133 Id. at 1276-77. 
134 Id. at 1285. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. at 1297 (Lord Walker), 1304 (Lord Carswell), 1310 (Lord Brown).  Even brevity could not conceal some 
differences:  Lord Walker acknowledged disagreement among his colleagues on the application of Pepper but 
“preferr[ed] to express no view” on the matter, while Lord Carswell discounted Lord Bingham’s use of 
parliamentary materials by declaring he had taken no account of defeated or withdrawn amendments, the history of 
which was recorded in Hansard.  The three remaining panel members, Lord Hope, Lord Rodger of Earlsferry, and 
Baroness Hale of Richmond, delivered separate opinions but did not comment on the Hansard issues. 
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v. Wealands,137 Lord Hoffmann—who had voiced misgivings about Pepper in some prior 
opinions—delivered a leading speech in which he relied at length on parliamentary proceedings 
to help explain what was meant in a private international law statute by “procedure,” even 
though he regarded the term as clear without resorting to Hansard.138 Lord Rodger applied a 
similar analysis, noting that available Hansard materials not only confirmed but strengthened the 
textual construction he would have offered anyway.139 Lord Carswell added a hopeful gloss on 
the court’s extended travails regarding legislative history.  He characterized Pepper as having 
been “out of judicial favour” in recent years, but expressed regret over this development, adding 
that ministerial statements were at times useful as an interpretive resource, “perhaps especially 
as a confirmatory aid.”140 
To sum up, the Law Lords in 2006 continue to rely on Hansard materials as an aid to 
statutory interpretation, albeit less enthusiastically than they did in the first fifteen months after 
Pepper was decided.  There is reason to believe that lower courts are referring to Hansard with 
some regularity as well, although such usage is beyond the scope of this article.141 Lord Steyn’s 
proposal to restrict judicial uses of Hansard to estoppel situations remains on the table, but it 
seems doubtful that most current Lords of Appeal would endorse it.142 Practical concerns based 
 
137 [2006] UKHL 32, [2006] 3 WLR 83. 
138 See [2006] 3 WLR at 92-93. 
139 See id. at 104. 
140 Id. at 106 (emphasis added).  A fourth panel member, Lord Woolf, also embraced the utility of Pepper to 
illuminate the meaning of statutory language if the text is unclear.  See id. at 86. 
141 See generally Vogenauer, supra note 3, at 635, 639-42; Kenny Mullan, The Impact of Pepper v. Hart, in THE 
HOUSE  OF LORDS: ITS PARLIAMENTARY AND JUDICIAL ROLES 213, 216-17, 229-33 (Paul Carmichael and Brice 
Dickson eds. 1999). 
142 As discussed in this Part, Lord Steyn and Lord Hope have embraced the notion that Hansard should be invoked to 
aid in construing statutory words or phrases only if warranted to estop the executive from abandoning prior 
representations, while Lord Nicholls and Lord Bingham have effectively rejected this position.  Lord Steyn has 
stepped down as a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary, and as of August 2007 he will be mandatorily retired from 
participating in judicial business.  See www.parliament.uk/about_lords/the_law_lords.cfm (visited Aug. 15, 2006).  
Meanwhile, Lords Hoffmann, Rodger, Carswell, and Woolf also have eschewed the proposed estoppel restriction, 
declaring as a general matter that Hansard remains a valuable aid to construing statutory text.  See also Philip Sales, 
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on cost-benefit calculations have arisen with some frequency in various judicial opinions.  At the 
same time, one member of the Law Lords has derided the “traditionalists” for acting “as if to be 
seen openly to read Hansard is akin to being caught with pornography,”143 and it is well known 
that judges privately acknowledge looking at Hansard considerably more often than they cite to it 
in their opinions.144 
II.  WHY LEGISLATIVE HISTORY USAGE REMAINS GREATER IN THE U.S. 
 
At this point, it is appropriate to ask what, if any, lessons for American statutory 
interpretation can be gleaned from the intricate yet somewhat muddled state of affairs in Britain.  
Does the Supreme Court rely on legislative history more often or less frequently than its British 
counterpart?  Do the two legal cultures share certain approaches to the value of legislative 
history or the basic justifications for its use?  Are there differences in the two law-making 
systems that can help explain why judicial reliance is greater in one country than the other?  In 
an effort to answer these and related questions, I turn to the perspective afforded by comparative 
analysis. 
A.  Empirical Observations 
For quantitative purposes, I have chosen to compare the Law Lords’ legislative history 
references from 1996 through 2005 with legislative history treatment by the Supreme Court 
during the same ten year period.  The comparisons are less than perfect because the universes of 
cases being reviewed are not identical.  On the British side, I have included all decisions with 
 
Pepper v. Hart, A Footnote to Professor Vogenauer’s Reply to Lord Steyn, 26 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 585, 585-86 
(2006) (contending that estoppel rationale has never been adopted as binding by the Law Lords). 
143 Robin Cooke, The Road Ahead for the Common Law, 53 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 273, 282 (2004).  Lord Cooke, 
formerly President of the New Zealand Court of Appeals, participated on Law Lords panels in 2001 and 2002. 
144 See generally note 54, supra and accompanying text. 
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opinions by the Law Lords from January 1996 through December 2005—a total of 591 cases.  
On the U.S. side, I have focused on two subsets of Supreme Court decisions from 1996 through 
2005 on which I had readily obtainable data—cases that directly addressed some aspect of the 
employment relationship (labor and employment decisions),145 and cases that involved 
interpretation of a federal tax statute  (tax decisions).146 
These two subsets of the Supreme Court’s overall decision docket comprise 145 
decisions or roughly one-fifth of all decisions with published opinions during the ten-year 
period.147 The tax decisions consist only of cases that involve the interpretation of a federal tax 
statute and thus are more likely to include references to legislative history than datasets that 
feature common law and constitutional decisions as well.148 Still, the two subsets of Supreme 
Court decisions, relating to separate areas of federal law, offer useful benchmarks for assessing 
whether recent British judicial interest in legislative history equals or approaches U.S. judicial 
investment in this interpretive resource. 
 
145 The ten years of labor and employment law cases are part of a dataset compiled by the author that consists of 
more than 650 cases decided between November 1969 and June 2006.  The dataset has been discussed in recent 
articles analyzing judicial reasoning.  See e.g., Brudney and Ditslear, supra note 7; James J. Brudney and Corey 
Distlear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND L. REV. 1 (2005).  For 
discussion of how the dataset was assembled, see Canons of Construction, supra at 15-16. 
146 The ten years of tax law cases are part of a dataset consisting of some 300 cases decided between November 
1953 and December 2005 that has been compiled by a team of law professors and social scientists.  See Nancy 
Staudt et al., Judging Statutes:  Interpretive Regimes, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1909 (2005); Lee Epstein et al., Judging 
Statutes:  Thoughts on Statutory Interpretation and Notes for a Project on the Internal Revenue Code, 13 WASH. U. 
J. L. & POL’Y 305 (2003).  For discussion of how the dataset was assembled, see Staudt et al., supra, at 1926-27. 
147 The Supreme Court decided some 750 cases with published opinions in the ten terms from 1996 through 2005. 
See Lee Epstein et al. THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM, tbl. 2-11 (3d ed. 2003); Statistics for the Supreme 
Court’s October Term 2005, 75 U.S. L.W. 3029 (July 18, 2006).   Between January 1996 and December 2005, the 
Supreme Court issued 127 labor and employment decisions and 24 tax decisions.  Six of these cases appear in both 
datasets:  they are decisions directly involving employees or their interests that also involve interpretation of a 
federal tax statute.  The six have been included in the tax decisions dataset only, in order to avoid duplication. 
148 The Law Lords decisions include such non-statutory cases, as does the Supreme Court labor and employment 
dataset.  Law Lords decisions that do not raise statutory issues typically involve matters of common law; these were 
roughly 13% of the 591 cases decided from 1996 through 2005.  Supreme Court labor and employment cases that do 
not raise issues of federal statutory law almost always involve constitutional questions; these were about 10% of the 
127 cases decided during the same ten years.  In addition, unlike the tax law dataset, the labor and employment 
decisions also include cases that focus on jurisdictional questions, evidentiary matters, and issues of state law—
which in the aggregate may be less likely to implicate legislative history than traditionally doctrinal matters of 
federal statutory interpretation. 
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For the two U.S. datasets, I report not only the numbers of cases in which legislative 
history is referenced or discussed by one or more of the justices, but also the numbers of cases 
where this resource is affirmatively relied on as a probative or determining factor in the 
majority’s reasoning process.  Use of legislative history as an asset to justify or buttress the 
Court’s holding is more powerful—and less frequent—than the total of all legislative history 
references.  Instances of reliance on legislative history do not include cases in which legislative 
history is referenced descriptively in the course of discussion, or is invoked in a “deflecting” 
manner to dismiss the value ascribed to it by a litigant, a lower court, or a dissenting justice.149 
Both reliance and overall reference are important and worth noting, and reporting them 
separately allows for a more nuanced appreciation of legislative history usage by the Supreme 
Court. 
I did not include a similar distinction for the Law Lords, however, because it was 
impracticable to do so.  The Law Lords do not issue formally designated majority opinions.150 
The leading speech may announce a result that is endorsed in speeches by other panel members, 
but in many instances these additional speeches do not include cross-references to the Hansard-
related reasoning of speeches delivered by colleagues, even the leading speech in the case.151 
Accordingly, it is simply too precarious to assume on any regular basis that one Lord of Appeal’s 
 
149For further discussion of this distinction between reliance on and reference to legislative history, see Canons of 
Construction, supra note 145, at 24-26. 
150 The Law Lords’ more individualistic style of judicial opinions stems in part from their structure of 
decisionmaking.  Sitting typically in panels of five judges, the twelve Lords of Appeal in Ordinary are unlikely to 
express either methodological or doctrinal positions with the coherence of our Supreme Court, which decides all 
cases en banc.  See generally Robertson, supra note 93, at 24-26. 
151 See, e.g.,Soneji, supra note 103, [2005] 4 All Eng. Rep. at 334-42 (opinions of Lord Rodger and Lord Cullen, 
reaching same result as Lord Steyn but without endorsing his reasoning or discussion of Hansard); Kuddus v. Chief 
Constable of Leicestershire [2001] UKHL 29, [2001] 3 All Eng. Rep. 193 (opinions by Lords Slynn, MacKay, 
Nicholls, Hutton, and Scott all reach same result, and Lords Slynn, Mackay, and Nicholls invoke Hansard, but no 
opinion endorses the reasoning of any other).  See generally John Leubsdorf, The Structure of Judicial Opinions, 86 
MINN. L. REV. 447, 489 (2001). 
35
reliance on, dismissal of, or citation to Hansard materials is endorsed by others who approve the 
same outcome. 
 Finally, in making the comparison between British and U.S. treatment, I have divided the 
ten year period into two equal intervals.  Legislative history references are identified for each 
five year interval as well as for the entire ten years.  Table One reports all results for the 1996-
2005 period. 
Table One—Legislative History Treatment 1996-2005: 
Percentage of Decisions* Invoking Legislative History152 
1996-2000 2001-2005 Total 
Law Lords Usage 5.6% (15) 13.4% (43) 9.8% (58) 
Supreme Court: Lab & Emp Reference 
 Lab & Emp Reliance 
 Tax Reference 
 Tax Reliance 
37% (25) 
25% (17) 
64% (7) 
55% (6) 
54% (29) 
30% (16) 
69% (9) 
23% (3) 
45% (54) 
27% (33) 
67% (16) 
37.5% (9) 
 
*Actual numbers of decisions using (Law Lords) or referring to/relying on (Supreme Court) legislative history for 
each time period are in parenthesis. 
 
As Table One indicates, the Law Lords made use of Hansard materials in at least one 
judicial opinion in 9.8 percent of the decisions issued between 1996 and 2005—58 of 591 cases.  
Usage has been fairly pervasive rather than being confined to a handful of individual judges.  
Over the ten year period, the 58 identified cases include 94 judicial opinions expressly invoking 
legislative history.  Of the 24 Lords of Appeal in Ordinary who served on more than fifteen 
panels during this period, 18 Lords referred to Hansard in at least one judicial opinion.153 Some 
 
152 “Law Lords usage” includes any decision in which at least one judicial opinion addresses or relies upon Hansard 
materials.  Similarly, “Supreme Court reference” includes any decision in which at least one justice’s opinion 
addresses legislative history in substantive terms.  “Supreme Court reliance” includes only those decisions in which 
the Court’s majority opinion relies on legislative history to help explain or justify the holding. 
153 Five of the six who did not refer to Hansard had two years or less of active service during this decade, and one of 
those (Lord Mustill, who retired in March 1997) had invoked Hansard in four opinions authored prior to 1996.  In 
addition, two other distinguished jurists (Lord Cooke and Lord Mackay of Clashfern) who participated on Law 
Lords panels during this period also invoked Hansard in their opinions.  Law Lords membership for the 1996-2005 
period was compiled from the respective volumes of All England Reports, which list Lords of Appeal in Ordinary 
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members of the court made greater use of parliamentary materials than others—four Lords of 
Appeal (Bingham, Hoffmann, Hope, and Steyn) discussed Hansard in at least nine of their 
opinions, and another five (Goff, Hobhouse, Hutton, Nicholls, and Slynn) referred to Hansard 
materials on either four or five separate occasions.  In 2005, the last year covered by Table One, 
six of the twelve sitting Lords of Appeal invoked legislative history materials in two or more 
opinions. 
The figures in Table One also reveal an intriguing tension between, on the one hand, the 
tenor of legislative history debates in the U.S. and Britain and, on the other hand, the reality of 
legislative history practice in the two countries.  In the United States, Justice Scalia has 
consistently criticized the use of legislative history as an aid to interpretation,154 and he has been 
joined by some other prominent jurists155 and legal academics.156 There is considerable evidence 
that the Supreme Court has been influenced by Justice Scalia’s position:  the Court’s reliance on 
legislative history has noticeably declined in the years since his arrival in 1986.157 In Britain, 
Pepper v. Hart opened the door to legislative history usage starting in the early 1990s.  Legal 
academics and some jurists have bemoaned the new propensity to refer to Hansard,158 but as 
 
(and other Lords who have held high judicial office and are eligible to hear appeals) at the front of each volume.  See 
also email from Helen McMurdo, Law Lords’ Office to Chad Eggspuehler, Sept. 26, 2006, copy on file with author. 
154 See, e.g., Antonia Scalia, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 29-37 (1997); 
Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 616-23 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring); Hirschey v. FERC, 777 
F. 2d 1, 7-8 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J. concurring). 
155 See, e.g., Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 219 (1994) (Scalia and Thomas J., concurring); In re 
Sinclair, 870 F. 2d 1340, 1343 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J.):  Wallace v. Christensen, 802 F. 2d 1539, 1559-60 
(9th Cir. 1986) (Kozinski, J. concurring). 
156 See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY _____ (2005); John F. Manning, Textualism as a 
Non-delegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 696-706 (1997); John Copeland Nagle, The Worst Statutory 
Interpretation Case in History, 94 N.W. L. REV. 1445, 1468-69 (2000). 
157 See Brudney and Distlear, supra note 7, at 222-24 (reporting decline in labor and employment cases since 1985, 
including in opinions authored by some liberal justices); Koby, supra note 7, at 384-95 (reporting decline since 
1980s, especially in opinions authored by more conservative justices); Charles Tiefer, The Reconceptualization of 
Legislative History in the Supreme Court, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 205, 212-20 (2000) (reporting decline from 1987 to 
1994).  See generally Manning, supra note 14. 
158 See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 93; Summers, supra note 93; Baker, supra note 3; McDonnell v. Congregation of 
Christian Brothers Trustees, [2004] 1 All E.R. 641, 655-56 (Lord Steyn); Wilson v. First County Trust Ltd., [2003] 
37
Table One indicates, citations to and discussion of parliamentary materials by the Law Lords 
have increased over the past five years. 
 The bottom line, however, is that legislative history continues to be invoked by the 
Supreme Court far more often than by the Law Lords, although the American dialogue has 
highlighted diminished usage and the British debate has focused on excessive references.  From 
1996 to 2005, Hansard materials were considered by at least one panel member in 9.8 percent of 
the 591 Law Lords decisions, whereas legislative history materials were discussed by at least one 
Supreme Court justice in 48.3 percent of the 145 reviewed cases.  Even when comparing the 
Supreme Court’s reliance on legislative history by majority authors to help justify a result as 
against the Law Lords’ references to legislative history as part of an individual judicial speech, 
Supreme Court reliance over the past decade—29.0 percent of the 145 reviewed majority 
opinions—is roughly three times greater than the Law Lords’ record of references.  When the 
comparison is closer to apples and apples—between references to legislative history by judges 
on the two highest courts—that history is invoked about five times more often by the Supreme 
Court. 
 One must be careful to keep these rather dramatic differences in perspective.  The overall 
caseload for the Law Lords is not as heavily statutory as the tax law and workplace law decisions 
examined for the Supreme Court.159 Accordingly, the Supreme Court cases reviewed here are 
somewhat more likely to trigger references to legislative history.  At the same time, the 9.8 
percent figure includes instances in which Hansard is referenced not for traditional statutory 
interpretation reasons but rather because parliamentary statements by ministers help the court to 
 
4 All E.R. 97, 130-31 (Lord Hope); Robinson v. Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, [2002] N. Ir. L. R. 390, 
404-05 (Lord Hoffmann). 
159 The “non-statutory” component, however, is less substantial in recent times than some might suppose.  See supra 
at note 148 (reporting that only about 13% of the 591 Law Lords decisions from 1996 through 2005 do not raise 
statutory issues). 
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understand agency policies that are being challenged as arbitrary or fundamentally unfair.160 
When those references are omitted, the remaining uses of Hansard—to assist the court in 
construing the particular words or general purpose of the statute itself—arise in only 6.4 percent 
of the 591 decisions.161 
It is also relevant that the Law Lords continue to cite to pre-legislative historical materials 
such as White Papers and commission reports as helpful in identifying the mischief behind a 
statute.  In the United States, the primary source for such purpose-related background 
information is legislative history, especially committee reports. 
Because White Papers and commission reports are invoked with some frequency, it 
seemed appropriate to calculate the Law Lords references to these pre-legislative materials over 
the same ten year period.  From 1996 through 2005, 69 additional Law Lords decisions—11.7 
percent of the total—include a judicial opinion that refers to White Papers and/or commission 
reports.162 My summary review of these references suggests that a fair number involved merely 
de minimis mention, something that was rarely true for references to Hansard during the ten year 
period.163 But assuming arguendo that all such references are to be treated identically, the 
combined number of cases in which either Hansard or pre-legislative historical materials are 
 
160 See supra at note 121 and accompanying text, and infra at notes 284-285 and accompanying text. 
161 Of the thirty-eight cases in which one or more panel members invoke Hansard for the traditional statutory 
interpretation reasons, twenty-seven cases involve references primarily related to the specific meaning of statutory 
words, while in eleven cases the principal focus is on the more general purpose or mischief at which the statute is 
aimed.  See note 123, supra. (Reporting this breakdown for two subperiods from 1996 to 2005). 
162 Cases invoking White Papers or Commission Reports were identified by following the Lexis search ((White 
Paper!) or (Commission w/s Report!)).  After removing duplicates and false positives, the search identified 101 
decisions, 32 of which also included one or more opinions invoking Hansard. 
163 See, e.g., Ward v. Commissioner of Police [2005] UKHL 32, [2005] 3 All Eng. Rep. 1013, 1017 (Baroness Hale); 
Transco v. Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council [2003] UKHL 61, [2004] 1 All Eng. Rep. 589, 593 (Lord 
Bingham).  The references that are more than de minimis were made to assist in identifying the mischief or purpose 
at which the statute is aimed.  See, e.g., Reg. v. Sec’y of State for Home Dept. [2005] UKHL 14 [2005] 2 All Eng. 
Rep. 240, 253-54 (Lord Bingham, referring to White Paper); Mark v. Mark [2005] UKHL 42, [2005] 3 All Eng. 
Rep. 912, 925-26 (Baroness Hale, referring to Law Commission Report). 
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invoked comes to 21.3 percent of the total—still less than one-half the level of Supreme Court 
references to legislative history. 
 One interesting feature of the Law Lords use of White Papers and commission reports is 
that these references virtually doubled during the second half of the ten year period—from 7.8 
percent in 1996-2000 to 14.9 percent in 2001-2005.164 Given that the proportion of decisions 
with Hansard references more than doubled during this same decade—from 5.6 percent in 1996-
2000 to 13.4 percent in 2001-2005—it would appear that the Law Lords are investing more time 
and thought generally in the interpretive potential of historical materials related to the legislative 
process. 
I explore some implications of this apparent trend in Part III.  Meanwhile, however, the 
gap between current legislative history usage by the Supreme Court and the Law Lords remains 
substantial and warrants some attempt at explanation. 
B. Similar Rationales for Valuing Legislative History 
Before suggesting factors that account for the sharp differences between the Law Lords 
and the Supreme Court, it is worth noting that there are important similarities in approach as 
well.  Legislative history advocates on the two courts have adopted much the same basic 
justifications for valuing that history as an interpretive asset.  As part of this support, legislative 
history proponents have responded in analogous terms to certain practical and conceptual 
objections voiced by critics in both countries. 
 In Pepper v. Hart, Lord Browne-Wilkinson reasoned that allowing courts to rely on 
parliamentary materials as an aid to construing ambiguous text would help enforce Parliament’s 
 
164 If one includes the 32 decisions in which both Hansard and pre-legislative materials were invoked, there is a 
parallel increase for the larger group of 101 cases—from 11.2 percent in 1996-2000 to 22.0 percent in 2001-2005. 
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true intent and thereby strengthen legislative supremacy.165 Applying the new rule of Pepper to 
the facts at hand, he further concluded that the exchanges between minister and members were 
sufficiently prominent, clearly articulated, and contextually persuasive to justify attributing to 
Parliament as a whole the understanding and intent expressed by the minister.166 
The principle of reasonably imputed institutional approval is also central to judicial 
rationales for relying on legislative history in the Supreme Court setting.  Justice Stevens, 
referring to Congress’s committee-based system of drafting and commenting on bills, has 
concluded that busy representatives and senators may appropriately be deemed to have relied on 
committee reports and the explanations contained therein to help capture the meaning or 
implications of the text on which they voted.167 Justice Stevens has further observed that a 
failure by the Court to infer congressional approval from suitably prominent and well-reasoned 
legislative history ignores persuasive evidence of congressional intent and disrespects the 
lawmaking supremacy accorded to the legislative branch.168 
Similarly, Justice Breyer and Justice Souter each have maintained that identifying a 
statute’s underlying purpose—very often with the help of legislative history—can provide 
essential guidance as to the meaning of enacted text.169 That purpose too is imputed on the basis 
of what a reasonable member of Congress would have had in mind.170 The purposive approach 
to statutory interpretation has long been embraced by British courts as well,171 and the court in 
 
165 See text accompanying notes 50-51 supra.
166 See text accompanying notes 67-70 supra.
167 See Bank One Chicago v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 276-77 (1996) (Stevens, J., concurring).  
This has been referred to as the “busy Congress” rationale.  See Tiefer, supra note 157, at 209, 252-53 (2000). 
168 See West Virginia Univ. Hospitals v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 115 (1991) (Stevens, J. dissenting). 
169 See Stephen Breyer, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 85-88 (2005), United 
States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 516 n.8 (1992) (Souter, J.). 
170 See Breyer, supra note 169, at 88, 93-94. 
171 See, e.g., R v. Z [2005] 3 All Eng. Rep. 95, 109 (Lord Woolf); Pepper [1993] 1 All Eng. Rep. at 64-65, 71 (Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson).  See generally Zenon Bankowski and D. Neil MacCormack, Statutory Interpretation in the 
United Kingdom in D. Neil MacCormack and Robert S. Summers, INTERPRETING STATUTES: A COMPARATIVE 
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Pepper relied on Hansard’s role in discerning legislative purpose as part of its justification for 
admitting parliamentary materials.172 
One additional dimension of each court’s rationale for using legislative history is that this 
resource is regarded by its supporters as clarifying or probative rather than conclusive.  
Proponents acknowledge there are risks of misuse, and that legislative history is not binding on a 
court reviewing the meaning of text.  At the same time, incidents of misuse are viewed as 
anecdotal rather than systemic; accordingly, reservations about reliance on legislative history are 
properly understood as going to the weight ascribed to such history in a given setting, not its 
admissibility in some larger sense.173 
Apart from sharing basic rationales, legislative history proponents in Britain and the U.S. 
have had to respond to similar concerns about the utility and legitimacy of this resource.  A 
major practical objection voiced on both sides of the Atlantic involves difficulties of access for 
practicing attorneys and others seeking to understand and comply with the law.  The court in 
Pepper acknowledged this concern but concluded it would have minimal impact, asserting that 
projected research costs were exaggerated and observing that attorneys and their clients were 
 
STUDY 359, 367 (1991); Robert G. Vaughn, A Comparative Analysis of the Influence of Legislative History on 
Judicial Decision-Making and Legislation, 7 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 26-28 (1996). 
172 See text accompanying note 52 supra. For a thoughtful discussion of how intent is imputed to legislatures and 
other group actors on philosophical and linguistic grounds, see Lawrence M. Solan, Private Language, Public Laws:  
The Central Role of Legislative Intent in Statutory Interpretation, 93 GEO. L. J. 427, 437-53 (2005).  See also 
Vaughn, supra note 171, at 40-41 (contending that legislative history reliance to help identify purpose constrains 
judicial discretion by inhibiting judges from letting their own preferences masquerade as those of Parliament); 
Stephen F. Ross & Daniel Tranan, The Modern Parol Evidence Rule and its Implications for New Textualist 
Statutory Interpretation, 87 GEO. L.J. 195 (1988) (contending that extrinsic evidence will mitigate, not aggravate, 
judicial bias in area of contract interpretation).  
173 See, e.g., Spath Holme, [2001] 1 All Eng. Rep. at 218 (Lord Nicholls), 223 (Lord Cooke); National Fed’n of Fed. 
Employees v. Department of the Interior, 526 U.S. 86, 96 (1999) (Breyer, J.).  See generally Vogenauer, supra note 
3, at 658-65; James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretation of Statutes:  Idle Chatter or 
Telling Response? 93 MICH. L. REV. 1, 49-56, 58-59 (1994). 
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adequately managing the analogous logistical and financial challenge of gaining access to often 
obscure agency regulations.174 
In the U.S., concerns about lack of access to legislative history were expressed over half a 
century ago by Justice Jackson.175 They appear to have been overstated even then, at least with 
regard to congressional committee reports and floor debates,176 and access to legislative history 
is less problematic today given online capabilities available through Westlaw and Lexis, and also 
non-fee services.177 Cost remains a relevant factor, but as with Hansard the expenses involved in 
securing access to legislative history are perceived as not materially different from the costs 
associated with reviewing or monitoring agency regulations.178 
Admittedly, electronic access may be somewhat more problematic with respect to 
Hansard than for core legislative history materials in the United States.  Parliamentary debates 
and proceedings are not available online as far back, nor can they be searched as efficiently as is 
the case for House and Senate committee reports and the Congressional Record.179 On the other 
 
174 See supra text accompanying notes 54-56. 
175 See United States v. Public Utilities Commission, 345 U.S. 295, 319-21 (1953) (Jackson, J. concurring). 
176 See Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND 
APPLICATION OF LAW 1247-52 (William N. Eskridge Jr. and Philip P. Frickey eds. 1994) (noting that at the time 
there were three or more depository libraries for U.S. government documents in every state, and that committee 
reports as well as the Congressional Record were routinely collected in these libraries.)  
177 For example, committee reports are available from 1995 and the Congressional Record from 1989 through the 
Library of Congress website, Thomas-Legislation, at http://thomas.loc.gov/. Reports and floor debates from 1994-
1995 onward also are available through the U.S. Government Printing Office website, at www.gpoaccess.gov/.
178 See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 
868-69 (1992).  Related to concerns about access, critics in both countries have expressed concern that judges would 
not be sophisticated enough to sift through legislative history and discern accurately the implications of various 
statements or exchanges.  See, supra text accompanying note 56 (referring to British concern); Statutory 
Interpretation and the Uses of Legislative History: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, 
and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 21-22 (1990) (hereinafter Stat. 
Interp. Hrg.) (statement of Judge James L. Buckley) (presenting American concern).  Legislative history advocates 
have basically dismissed these concerns as overstated, again noting that judges must separate wheat from chaff with 
respect to other contextual resources as well.  See, e.g., Pepper [1993] 1 All Eng. Rep. at 66; RICHARD POSNER, THE 
FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 287 (1995). 
179 Hansard is available at www.parliament.uk/hansard/hansard.cfm back to the 1988-89 session.  The site has a 
search feature and makes the Daily and Bound Volume Index available for particular sessions.  Relevant debates 
may be located by searching for the speaker (if known) or subject terms.  In the U.S., Westlaw provides U.S. Code 
Congressional & Administrative News (USCCAN) online back to 1948, allowing for access to key committee 
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hand, Britain is roughly one-fortieth the size of the U.S.,180 and attorneys in Britain generally 
will not have to travel as far as their American counterparts to locate basic legislative history 
materials in hard copy form. 
 An often-voiced conceptual criticism of reliance on legislative history is that it wrongly 
presumes the existence of a coherent legislative intent.  The concern is both that collective 
entities such as Parliament and Congress are not capable of having a single or uniform intention, 
and that even if such an intention could be hypothesized it cannot sensibly be extrapolated from 
isolated fragments of the legislative record.181 For present purposes, it is not necessary to 
evaluate these criticisms of intentionalism other than to note that they have essentially been 
responded to in the same ways by legislative history advocates in both countries. 
Proponents on the Supreme Court and the Law Lords have endorsed the view that the 
legislative process possesses a baseline measure of coherence.  They accept at least implicitly 
that legislators who agree a certain text should become law are able to reach a broadly shared 
understanding of the purpose(s) leading to a bill’s introduction and enactment, and they are 
further willing to infer that these same legislators may at times adopt a common perspective on 
the meaning and implications of certain specific provisions.182 As to the challenge of deriving 
 
reports and congressional record references accompanying enacted bills.  In addition, the Congressional Record is 
available on Westlaw and LEXIS from 1985 forward, all committee reports from 1990 forward, and committee 
hearings from 1993-94 forward.  Using the CIS index, a comprehensive list of legislative history documents can be 
generated by using the bill number.  The CIS index also can be searched by key word and speaker. 
180 See THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 2005, at 841, 843 (2006 ed.) (reporting that Britain comprises 
94, 525 square miles and the United States comprises 3, 718, 709 square miles). 
181 For some discussion of the argument against intentionalism in the British setting see Vogenauer, supra note 3, at 
632-33, 655 and sources cited therein.  For discussion of the same argument in the American context, see Manning, 
supra note 156, at 684-89 and sources cited therein. 
182 See, e.g., Pepper, [1993] 1 All Eng. Rep. at 71 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson), Spath Holme, [2001] 1 All Eng. Rep. 
at 219-23 (Lord Cooke); statements of Justices Stevens, Breyer, and Souter supra at notes 167-170.  For 
commentary from scholars in both countries supporting the view that legislation is a fundamentally purposive or 
intentional enterprise, see, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of 
Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 195-96 (1986); Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism be 
Defended Empirically? 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 636, 649 (1999); Stefan Vogenauer, What is the Proper Role of 
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persuasive evidence of intent from various pieces of the legislative history record, this is 
regarded as a practical problem, not a conceptual one.  Whether statements found in Hansard or 
congressional materials should sensibly be construed as part of a broader understanding among 
legislators depends on the identity of the speaker, the nature and visibility of his presentation, the 
reasoned elaboration contained in his remarks, and other factors that will vary from one statutory 
setting to the next, and hence go to the weight of this legislative evidence rather than its 
admissibility. 
 Finally, there is a persistent separation of powers objection to legislative history that is 
found in both legal cultures:  it is illegitimate to allow the unenacted intentions of legislators to 
trump the authority of enacted text or to usurp the interpretive role of courts.183 Once again, the 
responses given by the court in Pepper parallel those propounded in the United States. 
Legislative history, like other contextual resources, plays a supplemental role in that it helps 
attribute meaning to the actual statutory language.  A court’s reliance on this history to 
understand what Congress or Parliament has enacted is no more a usurpation of the judicial role 
than is reliance on canons of construction, or the dictionary, or prior agency interpretive 
practice.184 
C.  Key Differences in Legislative Process and Structure 
The similarities in certain basic rationales and responses summarized above contribute to 
an understanding of why legislative history is valued as an interpretive resource by the highest 
court in each country.  There are, however, a number of important differences between the 
 
Legislative Intention in Judicial Interpretation? 18 STAT. L. REV. 235, 237-41 (1997); Joseph Raz, Intention in 
Interpretation in THE AUTONOMY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LEGAL POSITIVISM 249, 257-68 (Robert P. George ed. 1996). 
183 See, e.g., discussion of Pepper in text accompanying note 24, supra; INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452-
53 (Scalia J., concurring); Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L. J. 
371, 375-76. 
184 See, e.g., Pepper, [1993] 1 All Eng. Rep. at 69; Stat. Interp. Hrg., supra note 178, at 6-7, 18-19 (statement of 
Judge Patricia Wald). 
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United States and Britain in terms of legislative processes and structures.  Notably, in contrast to 
Britain’s parliamentary system the congressional lawmaking enterprise confers a central role on 
standing committees, it regularly requires negotiation and compromise to achieve success, and it 
includes multiple decisional moments captured by distinct forms of internal commentary.  These 
differences—separately explored below—help account for why Supreme Court reliance on 
legislative history is more robust than is the case for the Law Lords.  
1.  Standing Committees and Committee Reports 
Among legislative history proponents in the United States, committee reports are 
regarded as especially useful in shedding light on the meaning or implications of inconclusive 
text.  Most legislation is written in standing committees whose members remain affiliated from 
one Congress to the next and develop a level of expertise over subject areas within their ongoing 
jurisdictional ambit.  Through formal hearings and executive sessions, and informal discussions 
and negotiations, committee members and their staffs devote substantial time and energy to 
considering the problems the proposed law is supposed to address and how best to address them.  
Committee reports tend to reflect this level of consideration, offering both an overview of the 
policy need or “general purpose” behind the legislation and also an analysis of how various 
sections or provisions would implement the statute’s “specific intent” in different factual and 
legal settings.185 
In addition to being well-informed, committee reports also are regarded as highly 
accessible due to a format that is orderly and understandable to other members, to the courts, and 
to the broader legal community.  Reports typically set forth a policy or problem that has given 
rise to the need for new legislation and then describe the solution proposed by the new law, 
 
185 See William N. Eskridge Jr., Philip Frickey, & Elizabeth Garrett, LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 311 (2d ed. 2006); William D. Popkin, MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 479 (4th ed. 2005). 
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highlighting features that respond to particular issues or concerns.  They also frequently include 
additional or minority views, enabling committee members who oppose all or part of the 
proposed solution to present their competing concerns in some depth.186 
Senators and congresspersons have extolled the educative virtues of committee reports 
both as members of the majority party and the opposition.  These legislators have analogized the 
report to the road map or “bone structure” of a statute, praising the report’s “central explanatory 
function” and its role in helping to address ambiguities.187 Even members of the minority have 
often looked to committee report explanations to understand what they were voting on,188 to help 
focus generally worded statutory text, or to prevent slippage from agreements reached among 
key legislators.189 
Although committee reports as aids to statutory interpretation have certain limits,190 their 
status as the best informed and most accessible category of legislative history has meant that 
federal courts turn to them first and foremost for guidance.  Thus it is not surprising that of the 
42 Supreme Court decisions in tax law or labor/employment law that actually relied on 
legislative history between 1996 and 2005, the legislative history deemed persuasive included 
committee reports some three-fourths of the time.191 
186 See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 101-263, at 1 (1990) (presenting table of contents for Senate committee report 
accompanying Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of 1990); Popkin, supra note 185, at 479 (describing standard, 
readily identifiable features of committee reports). 
187 Abner Mikva, Reading and Writing Statutes, 28 S. TEX. L. REV. 181, 184 (1986).  See also Stat. Interp. Hrg. 
supra note 178, at 2 (statement of Representative Kastenmeier, asserting on behalf of “most” members that 
committee reports can explain and amplify legislative language in ways that are instructive to the courts). 
188 Stat. Interp. Hrg., supra note 178, at 21 (statement of Judge James L. Buckley). 
189 See generally Orrin Hatch, Legislative History:  Tool of Construction or Destruction, 11 HARV. J. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 43, 46-48 (1998); Stat. Interp. Hrg., supra note 178, at 65 (statement of Representative Moorhead).  
190 Sometimes a report is irrelevant, as when a key provision has been added on the floor following committee 
deliberations.  Other times the report is as ambiguous or incomplete as the statutory text. 
191 See Table One supra (reporting Supreme Court reliance in 33 labor and employment decisions and 9 tax 
decisions).  The Court’s majority opinion relied on committee reports to help explain or justify the holding in 
twenty-five of thirty-three labor and employment cases that relied on legislative history and six of nine tax cases.  
By contrast, the Court relied on hearings or floor debates in roughly one-third of these decisions:  fourteen of thirty-
three labor and employment, and one of nine tax.  See also Jorge Carro & Andrew Brann, The U.S. Supreme Court 
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Committee reporting does not play the same role at all in the British legislative process.  
Standing committees in the House of Commons examine bills on a clause-by-clause basis, but 
this occurs after full House debate on the bill as a whole on Second Reading.192 Importantly, 
committee review of bill sections or clauses takes place only once the bill has received approval 
in principle from the House, whereas in Congress committee review and approval are 
presumptive preconditions to endorsement by the full chamber.  In addition, British standing 
committees are identified simply by a letter designation (e.g. A to H):  they are not assigned 
particular subject matter jurisdictions, and members are selected to serve for each new bill.193 
Accordingly, British committees lack the collective continuity and substantive competence that 
characterize standing committees in Congress.194 
Consistent with the differences between committees in terms of their cohesiveness, 
subject matter expertise, and basic function, the work products of parliamentary standing 
committees bear little resemblance to House and Senate committee reports.  British standing 
committees do not issue a detailed report that sets forth the bill’s purpose, summarizes the legal 
implications of various provisions, or recounts policy disagreements between bill supporters and 
opponents.  Instead, the committee work product is typically a transcript of the meetings at 
which clause-by-clause review occurred, reporting particular amendments that were moved, 
accepted, or withdrawn.195 This recounting of bill modifications, along with question-and-
 
and the Use of Legislative Histories:  A Statistical Analysis, 22 JURIMETRICS J. 294, 302 (1982) (reporting for an 
earlier period that one half of all Supreme Court references to legislative history were to committee reports.) 
192 See Zander, supra note 6, at 53-54. 
193 See id. at 54 & n.6; Parliamentary Stages of a Government Bill, 4, Factsheet L1, House of Commons Information 
Office (revised 2003) available at www.parliament.uk/factsheets.
194 See generally Standing Committees, 3-5, Factsheet L6, House of Commons Information Office (revised 2006), 
available at www.parliament.uk/factsheets. The 1969 report of the Law Commissions recognized that congressional 
committee reports provide a richer deliberative perspective than is available under Britain’s committee report 
proceedings.  See The Interpretation of Statutes, supra note 28, at 34, 38. 
195 See Factsheet L6, supra note 194, at 5.  See, e.g., House of Commons Standing Committee A 2005-06, Animal 
Welfare Bill Report of Proceedings, 8th Sitting, Jan. 26, 2006, afternoon; House of Commons Standing Committee A 
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answer exchanges between individual committee members and the government’s designated 
representative, can sometimes shed light on the meaning of a word or phrase in text, in much the 
same way as the similar record of amendments and exchanges that occurred in the House as a 
whole.196 But the record of committee proceedings does not offer a coherent explanation for the 
bill or an analysis of its key provisions and their policy implications.  Nor is this committee 
document made available to other legislators and their staffs prior to the initial decision to 
approve, modify, or reject the bill as written. 
 As noted earlier, one member of the Law Lords who harbors grave reservations about 
judicial use of Hansard has urged that each bill be accompanied by detailed explanatory 
memoranda patterned on congressional committee reports, and he intimated that courts could 
properly rely on such legislative materials.197 Since 1999, most public bills have been 
accompanied upon introduction by brief explanatory notes drafted by the government department 
responsible for the legislation.198 Unlike congressional committee reports, explanatory notes are 
neither prepared nor promoted from within the legislature.  Largely for this reason, the leading 
judicial critic of Hansard regards the new explanatory notes in the same way he assesses other 
ministerial statements.199 Meanwhile, in light of the considerable differences in standing 
committee work products, a primary source of reliable legislative history in the American 
context is simply missing from the British setting. 
2.  Compromise and Change During the Legislative Process 
2005-06, National Lottery Bill Report of Proceedings, 8th Sitting, Nov. 3, 2005, afternoon, both available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm/cmstand.htm.
196 Indeed, Pepper itself involved cites to the Financial Secretary’s exchanges with Standing Committee members 
that were reproduced in Hansard.  See text accompanying notes 67-69, supra.
197 See text accompanying note 99 supra (discussing recommendation by Lord Millett). 
198 See Reg. v. National Asylum Support Service, [2002] 4 All Eng. Rep. 654, 656-57 (Lord Steyn, describing new 
practice). 
199 See id., discussing explanatory notes as useful for identifying the mischief and in exceptional cases for estoppel 
against the executive, but never as reflecting the will of Parliament with regard to the meaning or scope of statutory 
language. 
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The committee report distinctions just described are part of a larger difference between 
Britain and the United States in terms of how statutes are produced.  In Britain, the lawmaking 
process is basically linear and efficient.  The government exercises control throughout, and 
participation by legislators on the floor or in standing committee generally has little substantive 
impact.200 The government conceives of and introduces virtually all public bills.201 A
considerable amount of government legislation is accepted at Second Reading by the opposition 
party.202 There may then be amendments offered seeking to clarify or refine particular bill 
clauses or sections, but these are extremely unlikely to be approved by Parliament if offered by 
opposition members or even government backbenchers.203 
Because the government enjoys majority support in Parliament for its legislative program 
and traditionally imposes tight party discipline, there is rarely a need for it to negotiate or modify 
its original position.  In the House of Commons, the government as bill manager is most 
concerned to push through to enactment and is likely to resist merits-based changes due to time 
constraints and related concerns about legislative derailment.204 Government-drafted 
amendments are accepted, but these usually result from subsequent thinking or planning by civil 
servants (perhaps stimulated by interest groups) rather than compromises or changes proposed by 
legislators.205 
200 See, e.g., R.H.S. Crossman, THE DIARIES OF A CABINET MINISTER 628-29 (1975); Douglas Hurd, The Present 
Usefulness of the House of Commons, 3 J. LEGIS. STAT. 1, 2-3 (1997). 
201 See generally Slapper & Kelly, supra note 19, at 56-57; Martin Partington, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ENGLISH 
LEGAL SYSTEM 40 (3d ed. 2006). 
202 See Zander, supra note 6, at 81 (reporting bipartisan support for half the government’s bills and vote by division 
on Second Reading in only 20 percent of government bills during 1970-74 period).  See also Catherine Elliott & 
Frances Quinn, ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 35-36 (7th ed. 2006) (discussing how whip system virtually ensures that 
government with a reasonable majority will get its legislation through at Second Reading). 
203 See Zander, supra note 6, at 82 (reporting 11 percent success rate for backbencher amendments and 5 percent for 
opposition members; 95 percent of amendments moved successfully in House of Commons were moved by 
ministers).  
204 See Hurd, supra note 200, at 2. 
205 See Zander, supra note 6, at 82.  See generally Partington, supra note 201, at 45. 
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The controlled and efficient process by which bills are introduced and enacted in 
Parliament has repercussions for the utility of legislative history.  Bills that become public laws 
generally originate from within government departments or derive from recommendations made 
by independent commissions or advisory committees.206 The purpose behind these bills—the 
mischief at which they are aimed—is typically set forth in some depth through government 
consultative documents such as White Papers or through commission reports.  The presence of 
such abundant pre-legislative materials means that a minister’s statement in committee or on the 
floor, explaining the bill’s purpose or the underlying mischief, is less likely to add substantial 
information or policy analysis that is new or otherwise unavailable. 
 Parliamentary debate about proposed or accepted amendments does produce information 
that is more apt to illuminate textual meaning in ways not expressed elsewhere.  Major 
substantive amendments are not, however, a regular part of the parliamentary enterprise.  The 
government, which is the only legislative player likely to have such major amendments accepted, 
has little incentive to offer them.  Ministers steering a bill through Parliament seldom view 
themselves as having to compromise or make significant textual modifications in order to 
prevail, and the record of parliamentary debates and proceedings therefore contains relatively 
few instances in which legislative history can illuminate the meaning of substantially revised or 
newly forged statutory text. 
Parliamentary exchanges can shed light on the understandings or implications 
surrounding more minor textual adjustments.207 This indeed was the situation in Pepper, where 
the Finance Minister explained a government decision—made under pressure from 
 
206 See Zander, supra note 6, at 3; Donald Gifford & John Salter, UNDERSTANDING THE ENGLISH SYSTEM 17-18 
(1997).  A smaller number of public laws stem from the ruling party’s election manifesto commitments or are in 
response to unexpected events in the public arena.  See Zander, supra at 3; Gifford & Salter, supra at 18. 
207 See, e.g., Re.R (a child) [2005] UKHL 33, [2005] 4 All Eng. Rep. 433, 437 (Lord Hope); Reg. v. Preddy, [1996] 
3 All Eng. Rep. 481, 487-88 (Lord Goff). 
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backbenchers—to withdraw an amendment that would have taxed in-house benefits at higher 
rates.208 Moreover, even in an efficient legislative environment, the ambiguities inevitably 
associated with complex statutory language often drafted under time pressures allow for 
legislative history to play some clarifying role.209 Still, the dearth of large scale bargaining or 
compromise as part of the legislative process diminishes the explanatory value of parliamentary 
narrative accompanying that process. 
 In the United States, by contrast, due to formal divisions in power between the executive 
and legislative branches as well as relatively lax party discipline and various procedural 
obstacles within Congress, most major bills that become public laws undergo substantial changes 
from introduction to final enactment.  For a start, bill introduction in Congress is not part of an 
organized or systemic government program.  The executive branch plays an important role in the 
development of many bills, but it is far from the exclusive initiating actor and may not even be 
the primary influence during periods when Congress and the presidency are controlled by 
different parties.210 
Both bill introduction and legislative agenda formulation are highly decentralized, shaped 
by committee chairs who function as independent policy entrepreneurs, by private interest 
groups that invest heavily in the re-election campaigns of individual members, and by state and 
local governments that exert special influence associated with their separate sovereign status.211 
Party leadership in both chambers labors with some success to classify and channel the cascade 
of bills that are introduced and emerge from committee.  Nonetheless, decisionmaking in the 
 
208 See Pepper, [1993] 1 All Eng. Rep. at 70. 
209 See id at 64; Zander supra note 6, at 21-24; Hurd supra note 200, at 1-2. 
210 Between 1968 and 2006, Congress (at least one chamber) and the Presidency were controlled by different parties 
for more than two-thirds of the time—27 of 38 years.  
211 See generally Alan Grant, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL PROCESS 45-52, 65-66, 302 (5th ed. 1994); James 
MacGregor Burns et al., GOVERNMENT BY THE PEOPLE 229, 353-61 (16th ed. 1995). 
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American legislative process is best viewed as dynamic and discontinuous rather than static or 
linear:  a leading observer’s depiction of Congress as “organized anarchy”212 aptly captures this 
reality. 
 The value attached to inefficiency in the congressional lawmaking model is further 
attributable to the range of procedural constraints that allow a determined minority to delay or 
obstruct legislation.  Some of these constraints are constitutionally explicit although many are 
not.213 When combined with the tumultuous nature of agenda-setting and the finite amount of 
time available, procedural obstacles effectively invite the formation of majority coalitions that 
can negotiate compromises in text at various stages of the process.  Many bills—especially if 
complex or controversial—are substantially modified or recast from their original form to 
accommodate the priorities of wavering colleagues or to coopt segments of the opposition.  
Alterations often take place in one or both chambers through the committee process or on the 
floor during full debate; they also occur in conference when substantive differences must be 
reconciled. 
 The baseline inefficiencies of Congress’s lawmaking process generate an added 
dimension to the value of legislative history in the U.S. setting.  Because substantial adjustment 
and compromise in text following a bill’s introduction is the rule more than the exception, 
committee or floor commentaries that accompany the particular stages of language modification 
are capable of shedding light on whatever qualitative changes have taken place.  Legislative 
deals and bargains are a well-recognized feature of American lawmaking, and in the face of text 
that is ambiguous or incomplete, legislative history may illuminate the existence of a 
 
212 John W. Kingdon, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 84-86 (2d ed. 1995). 
213 Examples of procedural constraints not specified in the Constitution include committee referral and markup, floor 
debate and amendment, Rules Committee control in the House, filibusters in the Senate, and reconciliation between 
two versions through conference. 
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compromise or help to explain certain subtle aspects of the bargain.  Several examples from 
relatively recent Supreme Court case law indicate the Court’s appreciation for how legislative 
history plays these roles. 
 In a 1985 decision addressing whether the fiduciary to an employee benefit plan could be 
held liable for extra-contractual damages under ERISA,214 the Court relied in part on legislative 
history to hold that Congress had not intended to authorize any remedies other than through the 
plan itself.215 Justice Stevens for the majority emphasized that the broad statutory relief 
described in the Senate committee report differed from the bill version passed by the House, and 
that the compromise reached in conference followed the House approach.216 
A similar instance of invoking legislative history to help establish the existence of a 
compromise occurred in a 1985 decision reviewing whether the Environmental Protection 
Agency was prohibited from issuing certain pollutant discharge waivers under the Clean Water 
Act.217 Justice White for the majority noted that an early version of the bill had proposed 
banning the waivers and that the House-Senate negotiated version of text was inconclusive.  The 
majority then relied on the House manager’s explanation of the negotiated Conference version to 
his colleagues on the House floor, in determining that Congress had not meant to include the 
waivers as part of the final statutory deal.218 
The Court also uses legislative history to help discern subtle dimensions of a legislative 
bargain.  A 1994 decision construing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act relied on legislative 
 
214 ERISA is the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. 
215 Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 145-46 (1985). 
216 Id. For another ERISA example, see Laborers Health Trust v. Advanced Lightweight Concrete, 484 U.S. 539, 
549 (1988) (relying on floor debate to help establish that Congress did not legislate as protectively as employees 
contended). 
217 See Chemical Mfrs. Ass’n v. Natural Resources Defense Council Inc., 470 U.S. 116 (1985). 
218 See id. at 126-27.  For another Clean Water Act example, see Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 315-
20 (1982) (relying on committee report to help clarify that Congress established a permit system as middle ground 
solution given “the impracticality of any effort to halt all pollution immediately”). 
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history to establish that supporters and opponents had in effect agreed to disagree on whether the 
highly contentious 1991 amendments to Title VII should be applied retroactively.219 Based on 
an elaborate review of earlier bill versions and Senate floor debates—indicating that no deal had 
been reached on the controversial retroactivity issue—Justice Stevens for the Court went on to 
hold in favor of the traditional presumption against retroactivity, noting the absence of a 
congressional intent to overcome that presumption.220 
The examples reviewed here are not meant to suggest that legislative history commentary 
is essential to identifying the existence or contours of compromises reached during lawmaking.  
Negotiated final arrangements are at times discernible from textual analysis,221 and in any event 
not all legislative history accurately captures the essence or fine points of these arrangements.  
What matters for comparative purposes is that substantial textual change is a regular feature of 
the congressional lawmaking process in a way that differs fundamentally from the British 
parliamentary experience, and that this difference has consequences for the utility of legislative 
history. 
To be sure, compromise on basic policy choices and implementation strategies does 
occur in Britain, but differences typically are resolved before bill language is made public—
through debate within a law reform commission, the upper levels of a government ministry, or 
the Prime Minister’s inner circle.  Given the emphasis on pre-legislative negotiation, it is entirely 
rational for British courts to refer regularly to commission reports and White Papers, as noted in 
Part II.A above.  By contrast, our system relies far more heavily on compromise following bill 
 
219 See Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994). 
220 See id. at 250-63.  For another example under Federal anti-discrimination law, see Public Employees Retirement 
System of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 178-80 (relying on legislative history of 1967 Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act to construe an employer exemption that reflected a compromise among competing congressional 
goals). 
221 See generally John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 71, 76-79 
(2006).  
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introduction.  Divisions of power between Congress and the President, and between the House 
and Senate, encourage negotiations at various stages of a bill’s progression, and legislative 
history associated with these different stages may well capture important dimensions of any 
deals that are struck.  Accordingly, it is not surprising that the Supreme Court recognizes and 
relies on such history to help understand post-introduction legislative bargains, something that is 
far less likely to occur for the Law Lords. 
3.  Singular versus Diverse Sources of Legislative History 
The dominant role played by the executive branch in the British lawmaking process has 
additional implications with respect to judicial use of legislative history.  Prior to Pepper, some 
opponents of legislative history voiced the concern that if interpretive resources were to include 
parliamentary statements by ministers, courts would in effect be redistributing power from the 
legislative branch to the executive by allowing ministerial commentary to influence the meaning 
of enacted text.222 The court in Pepper did not explicitly address this particular separation of 
powers concern.223 The decision to admit ministerial statements, however, effectively implies 
that any risks of executive branch interference with parliamentary sovereignty were outweighed 
by the benefits of having access to potentially enlightening explanatory materials.  Deferring for 
the moment whether the executive branch is likely to misuse these new powers,224 it is worth 
noting that the test set forth in Pepper restricts judicial access to legislative history by making 
ministerial participation virtually an essential component of what is admissible. 
 
222 See Bankowski and MacCormack, note 171 supra, at 381.  See also Styles, supra note 3, at 155-57 (raising same 
concern in immediate aftermath of Pepper). 
223 Lord Browne-Wilkinson addressed a different separation of powers concern, namely that admitting parliamentary 
commentary in court would impinge on the interpretive powers of the judiciary.  See text accompanying note 58 
supra.
224 See Part II.C.4. infra. 
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With respect to the different uses of legislative history sanctioned by Pepper and 
subsequent decisions, ministerial presentations are necessary when seeking a clearer 
understanding of the government’s own policy that is being subjected to judicial review.225 
Ministerial statements are obviously important in other judicial review contexts as well, such as 
identifying the mischief at which the statute is aimed and shedding light on the meaning of 
particular words or phrases in text.  It is conceivable, however, that exchanges among 
backbenchers or opposition members could offer probative evidence in these latter settings even 
without participation by a government representative. 
 The Law Lords on rare occasions have referred to non-ministerial exchanges during 
parliamentary debate as aids to construing the meaning of text.226 Still, the expectation in light 
of Pepper is that ministerial statements are centrally important,227 and the Law Lords invoke 
such statements in almost all instances, usually with little or no reference to contextual remarks 
by ordinary legislators.228 This limitation on the sources of validly admissible legislative history 
means that only a subset of parliamentary debates and proceedings is available for judicial 
reference. 
 By contrast, the universe of legislative history sources to which courts have access in the 
U.S. setting is considerably broader.  The executive branch regularly contributes to the creation 
of legislative history as part of its role in the lawmaking process.  Contributions occur primarily 
through testimony at committee hearings but also through memoranda or statements placed in 
the Congressional Record as attachments to floor remarks by a leading bill advocate or 
 
225 See notes 35-36 and note 119 supra and accompanying text (discussing opinions in Brind and Wilson).   
226 See, e.g., Stubbings [1993] 1 All Eng. Rep. at 329 (opinion of Lord Griffiths, relying on statements from proposer 
of bill, a backbencher); R and Preddy [1996] 3 All Eng. Rep. at 487-88 (opinion of Lord Goff, relying on statements 
from two members of House of Lords). 
227 See Pepper [1993] 1 All Eng. Reg. at 64, 67. 
228 See, e.g., Anderson, [2002] 4 All Eng. Rep. 1089, 1093-96; Reg. v. Ministry of Def. Ex. p. Walker, [2000] 2 All 
Eng. Rep. 917, 920-21. 
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opponent.229 As previously discussed, however, the executive branch often is not the most 
influential actor in legislative proceedings; multiple members of Congress typically play 
important roles in the various stages of moving a bill to final enactment. 
 There are innumerable occasions on which legislative history sources unrelated to 
executive branch participation are deemed to help clarify the meaning of enacted text.  For 
instance, when a congressional committee has eliminated bill language that would have 
supported one party’s claims, the Supreme Court may well invoke this change based on its 
presumption that Congress does not intend to enact language it has earlier deleted.230 Similarly, 
when bill sponsors and supporters describe a provision’s principal aim during floor debate, such 
evidence of purpose may lead the Court to conclude that a permissible reading of text is also the 
correct reading.231 
Even if a bill changes very little from introduction to passage, there are distinct decisional 
moments when legislative history can help narrate or explain what has occurred.  Committee 
reports, floor colloquies reflecting shared understandings, floor statements from managers on 
both sides of the aisle, and conference reports all can shed light on the meaning of text.  Given 
this range of sources, the Supreme Court simply has more types of legislative history material to 
consider relying on than does its British counterpart. 
4.  Opportunism in the Creation of Legislative History 
A final structural issue is the possibility that legislative history will be generated for 
opportunistic reasons, especially by key participants.  Courts are prepared to rely on legislative 
history as an aid to construing text, and pivotal actors in the legislative process are aware of this 
 
229 See, e.g., Bank America Corp. v. United States, 462 U.S. 122, 134-35 (1983) (analyzing executive branch 
testimony at House committee hearing); Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 262 (1994) (discussing 
“interpretive memorandum” prepared with executive branch input and introduced on floor by bill sponsors). 
230 See Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 93 (2001). 
231 See West v. Gibson, 527 U.S. 212, 218-20 (1999). 
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reliance.  The risk therefore arises that legislative history will include explanations or assertions 
about the text refashioning or deviating from the presumptively shared understanding of what 
that text means.232 To the extent that courts have good reason to worry about such abuses, their 
willingness to rely on legislative history may be chilled.  Accordingly, it is worth considering the 
likelihood that legislative history in the British and American settings will be manipulated by its 
creators. 
 In Britain, the concern is over manipulation by the executive branch.  The executive is 
ultimately in charge of drafting virtually all statutory text, and it is also the central player in 
creating relevant legislative history.  The bright line test set forth in Pepper can be viewed as 
allowing if not inviting strategic behavior, by conferring probative value on clear ministerial 
statements so long as a court decides that text itself is sufficiently ambiguous.  Thus, a minister 
worried about the politics of a vote on some controversial issue could avoid a tough public 
choice by fudging the relevant text and packing the parliamentary record to slant the ambiguous 
provision in terms the government would prefer.233 Alternatively, ministers can infuse the record 
with statements purporting to spell out the meaning of statutory sections, anticipating that courts 
will tend to defer to such statements instead of launching a more rigorous examination of the 
underlying text.234 
232 Concern over opportunism in the creation of legislative history is distinct from the concern that honestly 
produced legislative history will at times be unreliable.  Even responsible and well prepared participants (such as 
congressional committee chairs or parliamentary ministers) are not always able to deliver precise statements or 
complete responses in the harried atmosphere of legislative debate.  Committee chairs are more likely to offer 
comprehensive and well-considered explanations in committee reports than in the pressured setting of an exchange 
on the floor.  Similarly, a minister who is thoroughly briefed by her staff is less likely to miscommunicate the 
meaning of a textual provision than one who responds to questions from members without consulting with her 
department.  Courts in both countries must assess the reliability of legislative history based on a range of factors, just 
as they do when confronted with arguments from counsel about the reliability of particular dictionary definitions or 
canons of construction. 
233 See generally Miers, supra note 82, at 706. 
234 See generally Styles, supra note 3, at 156-57. 
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There is no indication in the Law Lords opinions applying Pepper that the court has 
found ministers engaging in such strategic behavior.  Although the conduct may be occurring 
without judicial awareness, ministers will be constrained to some degree by the civil servants and 
parliamentary counsel who prepare advice for them regarding the meaning of statutory 
provisions, and also by the interest groups and media representatives that pay attention to 
parliamentary proceedings on important or controversial bills.  If a minister in her explanation to 
Parliament departs from or distorts the professional advice she has received, such conduct could 
be leaked by presumptively neutral officials or attentive lobbyists to interested legislators as well 
as the media.235 It is, however, difficult to gauge at this point whether the prospect of informal 
oversight—especially with respect to civil servants in the minister’s own department—is having 
a substantial deterrent effect. 
 In the United States, the main concern about manipulation of legislative history stems 
from the plethora of record materials being produced by actors within Congress.236 Executive 
branch personnel, interested parties outside of government, and members and their legislative 
staffs all may be players on a particular bill, and all have a stake in leaving their mark on the 
statutory product.  Lengthy committee reports, as well as floor colloquies or statements by bill 
managers that are inserted unspoken into the Congressional Record, provide ample opportunities 
for strategic behavior. 
 
235 See generally, Miers, supra 82 note, at 706-07. 
236 In contrast to Britain’s parliamentary structure, the executive branch has no privileged role in generating 
legislative history as part of the congressional enactment process although it often makes important contributions.  
See note 229 supra and accompanying text.  Beginning in the Reagan era, presidential signing statements—
delivered after bicameral approval and presentment—have been used with some frequency as part of an effort to 
influence the way a statute is interpreted by the courts.  See ABA Task Force Report, supra note 13, at 10.  Recently, 
President Bush has used signing statements more extensively to declare that he will not enforce portions of the text 
that he is signing into law, based on his interpretation of what the enacted language means or his desire to avoid a 
perceived constitutional problem.  This qualitative change in the use of signing statements has been met with 
criticism by members of Congress from both parties and by leaders in the legal profession.  See e.g., Senate 
Judiciary Committee Hearing, supra note 13; ABA Task Force Report, supra note 13.  The legal and policy 
implications of post-enactment Presidential Signing Statements are beyond the scope of this article. 
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There are constraints on such behavior by legislative actors—notably certain incentives 
within the legislative process that operate to encourage accuracy and probity, especially by 
committee leaders (who tend to function as bill managers) and their staffs.237 In the short term, 
members know they must rely on colleagues’ representations at the committee stage as to what a 
bill means, because Congress operates heavily through its committees and members depend upon 
the accuracy of committee-based information in moving the agenda.  More generally, members 
as repeat players typically aspire in the long-term to a positive relationship with their colleagues 
and with the institution.  The desire to be viewed as honest and fair even during fierce partisan 
disputes thus creates an impetus for committee leaders and floor managers not to overstate or 
understate a bill’s general or specific objectives.238 
The content and format of committee reports also are visible enough to help offset the 
risk of manipulation.  Minority views in a report can point out a failure to present adequately or 
accurately the position of the majority, or highlight areas of disagreement among committee 
members.  This provides notice to other legislators, their staffs, and the leadership about the need 
to consider controversial matters when the bill reaches the floor.239 
In the end, it is difficult to compare the frequency with which legislative history is 
opportunistically created in British as opposed to American settings.  Risks of abuse arise from 
different factors, related to distinct aspects of the respective legislative processes.  The main 
protection against such abuse involves whistleblowing and its related reputational consequences.  
 
237 This and the following paragraph in text rely on positions previously presented by the author.  See Brudney, 
supra note 173, at 54, 59. 
238 Moreover, congressional staff are not likely to act strategically without their boss’s approval given their status as 
agents more dedicated to their principal than would be true elsewhere in the labor market.  Staff are recruited to 
work for committees based in part on loyalty to the chair or hiring members.  Members are also sensitive to conduct 
that might threaten their own job security, and staff performance is often effectively monitored by the media as well 
as the hiring member.  Finally, unlike many government personnel, congressional committee and personal office 
staff are at-will employees.  See generally Brudney, supra note 173, at 50. 
239 See note 186 supra and accompanying text, discussing how presence of minority or additional views is readily 
apparent from table of contents.   
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Both lawmaking systems include actors with ample reasons to sound an alarm against legislative 
commentary that overstates or undermines the agreed-upon meaning of text.  These reasons may 
more likely stem from political or partisan factors in the U.S., and from professional or civil 
service considerations in Britain.  Nonetheless, whistleblowing constraints operate in each 
lawmaking system that would seem to render the incidence of abuse anecdotal rather than 
systemic. 
Underlying these constraints is a belief that the primary audience for legislative history is 
other members and not judges.  Commentary in standing committees or on the floor can be 
attributed to Parliament or Congress as a whole because (or insofar as) the prominence, 
amplified reasoning, and persuasive context of the commentary suggests what a reasonable 
legislator would have had in mind when voting on the text.  By relying on the principle of 
reasonably imputed institutional approval, both the Supreme Court and Law Lords have 
implicitly endorsed that belief.240 
Still, even if it is impracticable to determine which legislative history setting is more 
susceptible to manipulation, the three prior factors examined in this part help explain why 
legislative history usage is higher in the Supreme Court than the Law Lords.241 Standing 
committees in the American setting generate more cohesive and substantively competent 
indications of statutory meaning than their British counterparts.  Further, because legislative 
bargaining and compromise are more frequent in the American context, the accompanying 
commentary is more likely to include reliable insights as to how the legislative process has 
 
240 See text accompanying notes 165-172 supra.
241 My focus has been on factors directly related to the availability and reliability of legislative history.  Certain more 
extrinsic factors also may play a role—for instance, the relative propensity of American and British courts to prefer 
canons of construction to legislative history when seeking to resolve textual ambiguity or confirm textual meaning.  
For a discussion of how the Supreme Court uses the canons in this regard, see Canons of Construction, supra note 
145, at 29-36, 77-95.  Consideration of the Law Lords’ use of canons, and comparative analysis on this point, are 
deferred to a future article. 
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shaped the intent underlying enacted text.  Finally, the breadth of legislative history sources 
available in connection with congressional lawmaking offers courts more materials from which 
to glean what the legislature meant when enacting certain inconclusive words or phrases. 
 
III. PREDICTIVE AND NORMATIVE REFLECTIONS 
Notwithstanding lower levels of legislative history use by the Law Lords than the 
Supreme Court, the Lords of Appeal have now had fourteen years of exposure to parliamentary 
materials since Pepper. The initial ebb and flow of their participation, described in Part I, 
featured expressions of judicial frustration as well as enthusiasm, but certain signals have begun 
to emerge.  Recapping key recent developments, Part III.A predicts that the Law Lords are likely 
to build on the foundation of Pepper and may well expand upon current patterns of use.  
Assuming that there will be no British retreat to the pre-1992 position, Part III.B offers 
preliminary normative thoughts based on comparisons of how the two high courts currently 
debate and apply this interpretive resource.  It proposes that the Supreme Court might wish to 
move beyond what has become a somewhat stilted debate between legislative history advocates 
and opponents by borrowing from the British approach.  It also suggests that the Law Lords’ 
early efforts to categorize different kinds of parliamentary exchanges as either admissible or 
disqualified should yield to the more ad hoc flexible approach followed by Supreme Court 
justices who make use of legislative history. 
A.  The Next Stage of Post-Pepper Development 
Quantitative data presented earlier suggests that the Law Lords are in the process of 
consolidating if not augmenting a permanent role for legislative history as an interpretive asset.  
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The proportion of Law Lords decisions in which at least one judge discusses Hansard materials 
was more than twice as high in 2001-2005 as in 1996-2000.242 In addition, the proportion of 
decisions referencing White Papers or commission reports increased substantially in the 2001-
2005 period.243 Those pre-legislative materials were deemed admissible in court long before 
Pepper. Still, it seems plausible to regard the Law Lords’ increased propensity to refer to them 
as part of a growing appreciation for how the intentions underlying enacted text can be identified 
and applied based on historical evidence as well as linguistic analysis. 
 Perhaps more revealing than aggregate trends are two recent decisions in which the Law 
Lords stretched their initial rule in setting forth grounds for relying on Hansard.  Although 
Pepper’s three part test credited only explanatory statements by a minister or other prominent 
bill supporter,244 Lord Bingham’s leading speech in the 2005 case of Reg. (Jackson) v. Attorney 
General relied on the Hansard-recorded history of approved and defeated amendments to 
illuminate the meaning of text.245 Lord Bingham and his colleagues understood that he was not 
consulting Hansard materials strictly as authorized under Pepper, because in their view the text 
was sufficiently clear without such consultation.246 Lord Bingham’s reliance on drafting history 
during the legislative process—reviewed and analyzed through reference to Hansard—represents 
a notable if unacknowledged extension of the court’s earlier approach. 
 
242 See Table One, supra at text accompanying note 152.  This latest five year average, comprising roughly one-
seventh of the court’s decision docket, includes many non-controversial uses of Hansard addressing agency policy 
that is under judicial review or the background mischief at which a statute is aimed.  But there also are a substantial 
number of judicial opinions using parliamentary materials for the more controversial primary objective established 
in Pepper—to help determine the meaning of text that is ambiguous or obscure.  See notes 121-123 supra and 
accompanying text. 
243 See note 164, supra and accompanying text.  
244 See Pepper, [1993] 1 All Eng. Rep. at 69, discussed supra at notes 61-63 and accompanying text. 
245 See Jackson [1995] 4 All Eng. Rep. at 1263-64, 1268. 
246 See id. at 1271 (Lord Bingham), 1276-77 (Lord Nicholls), 1285 (Lord Steyn).  The Hansard-related reasoning in 
these three opinions is discussed supra at notes 128-135 and accompanying text.  Lord Nicholls announced his view 
that ministerial statements were valuable to confirm the apparent meaning of text, setting forth a position 
subsequently endorsed by Lords Hoffmann, Rodger, and Carswell.  See infra at text accompanying notes 248-250. 
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Similarly expansive is the court’s self-conscious valuing of Hansard for confirmatory 
purposes in the 2006 case of Harding v. Wealand.247 Although Pepper permitted the use of 
ministerial statements only if text was ambiguous or obscure, Lord Hoffman and Lord Rodger 
each relied on a parliamentary statement by the Lord Chancellor—offered to defuse a possible 
amendment—in order to strengthen their reading of language they regarded in any event as 
neither ambiguous nor obscure.248 Lord Carswell, implicitly recognizing this enlargement of 
Pepper’s conceptual domain, declared that ministerial statements may be most valuable in 
practice to confirm that the text means what it seems to say.249 
The conclusion that Hansard may be invoked for such supportive or reinforcing purposes 
is noteworthy because it brings the legitimization of legislative history use more in line with 
decades of somewhat covert judicial practice—from Lord Denning’s 1979 confession that he 
often peeked at Hansard (presumably to see if he had missed anything)250 to recent extrajudicial 
statements that the Law Lords look to Hansard (presumably for reassurance) far more often than 
they actually cite to the parliamentary record.251 This use of legislative history to confirm plain 
meaning also brings British justifications more in line with our own.252 Ironically, legislative 
history reliance for confirmatory purposes may be declining in the Supreme Court, as justices 
comfortable with such uses decide, even if subconsciously, not to risk losing the allegiance of 
 
247 See Harding, [2006] 3 WLR 83. 
248 See id. at 93 (Lord Hoffmann), 104 (Lord Rodger). 
249 See id. at 106-07 (Lord Carswell).  The Hansard-related reasoning in the three Harding opinions is discussed 
supra at notes 137-140 and accompanying text.  The Law Lords had ignored the first of the three Pepper factors 
(that the text must be ambiguous or obscure) in some early decisions—see note 82 supra and accompanying text—
but they had not previously embraced in such open and deliberative terms the legitimacy of using Hansard for 
confirmatory purposes.  
250 See note 33, supra and accompanying text. 
251 See note 54 and accompanying text (discussing Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s observation in Pepper that many 
distinguished judges acknowledged they already were looking at Hansard to discern the intention of Parliament). 
252 See, e.g., Stat. Interp. Hrg., supra note 178, at 5-6, 14-15 (statement of Chief Judge Patricia Wald) (reviewing 
Court’s decisions from 1989 Term that use legislative history to confirm apparent textual meaning); Stephanie 
Wald, The Use of Legislative History in Statutory Interpretation Cases in the 1992 Term:  Scalia Rails But 
Legislative History Remains on Track, 23 SW. U. L. REV. 47, 50-53 (analyzing five decisions from 1992 Term that 
used legislative history to support or confirm a conclusion reached after determining that text was not ambiguous). 
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Justice Scalia or Justice Thomas by invoking the resource when it performs a supportive rather 
than essential function.253 
The quantitative and doctrinal evidence highlighted here does not mean that the Law 
Lords will now proceed to expand steadily their use of Hansard.  The fourteen years since 
Pepper was decided contrasts with U.S. experience of 114 years since the Supreme Court 
decided Holy Trinity Church,254 the case that in retrospect is viewed as ushering in our modern 
legislative history era.255 It was several decades after Holy Trinity Church before judicial 
reliance on legislative history became a relatively consistent practice.256 British judges and 
academics continue to express some second thoughts about the rule of Pepper and its 
consequences, and the Law Lords may well endure a period of uneven development with respect 
to Hansard references for the near future. 
 Nonetheless, the Law Lords since 1992 have come to rely on legislative history for a 
range of theoretical reasons that are familiar to American judges and legal academics.  As 
evidenced in Pepper, parliamentary debates are on occasion important in traditional rule-of-law 
terms to help resolve the meaning of ambiguous text.  As demonstrated in Jackson and Harding,
both drafting history and ministerial exchanges may be valuable from an intentionalist standpoint 
to reinforce or confirm that the apparent meaning of certain statutory words or phases is also the 
meaning that members of Parliament most probably had in mind.  Finally, as indicated in a series 
 
253 See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 7, at 222-24 (reporting and discussing their finding that three justices who 
served for substantial periods before and after Justice Scalia’s arrival in 1986 relied on legislative history 
significantly less often in their majority opinions written since 1986); Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the 
Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 365 (1994) (attributing majority decline in legislative 
history use to realities of building majority coalitions among justices in face of uncompromising stance by Justices 
Scalia and Thomas). 
254 Rector of Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892). 
255 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Philip P. Frickey, & Elizabeth Garrett, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 
680-81 (3d. ed. 2001).  For two comprehensive and thoughtful yet conflicting analyses of Holy Trinity Church, see 
Carol Chomsky, Unlocking the Mysteries of Holy Trinity:  Spirit, Letter, and History in Statutory Interpretation, 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 901 (2000); Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial Competence:  The 
Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1833 (1998). 
256 See generally Eskridge, supra note 16, at 392; Frankfurter, supra note 1, at 543. 
66
of decisions,257 the parliamentary record is relevant in a purposivist context for describing certain 
background policy rationales that help inform the interpretive enterprise.  In short, the Law Lords 
appear to be broadening their insights as to how reference to Hansard sheds light on the existence 
of legislative intent and also helps clarify the context in which Parliament chose to enact certain 
language as statutory text.258 
B.  Possible Lessons From Comparative Experience 
It seems likely that legislative history references will remain a feature of statutory 
interpretation by British courts even as reservations continue to be expressed.  With that prospect 
in mind, I offer some preliminary thoughts on what the Supreme Court and Law Lords might 
learn from one another in terms of how each currently approaches the use of legislative history. 
1.  Judicial Debate Between Advocates and Skeptics—A Lesson for the Supreme Court? 
When the Law Lords in Pepper abandoned prior precedent and authorized consideration 
of parliamentary proceedings, they made clear that their new interpretive approach would require 
judges to assess just how helpful Hansard might be on a case-by-case basis.  Although the 
legislative history at issue in Pepper was deemed highly persuasive by the majority,259 Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson repeatedly observed that as a general proposition parliamentary materials 
contain simply an indication of what mischief was aimed at or what cure intended by the use of 
certain words.260 The opinions in Pepper regarded Hansard as one among many aids to the 
construction of ambiguous text, one that can assist the court to varying degrees depending on the 
 
257 See, e.g. cases identified at note 122, supra and accompanying text. 
258 Cf. Chomsky, supra note 255, at 951-52 (suggesting reasons why American judges should consult legislative 
history based on lessons from Holy Trinity Church). 
259 See text accompanying notes 44-47 and 67-70 supra (recounting how majority shifted from pro-government to 
pro-taxpayer outcome largely due to legislative history). 
260 See Pepper, [1993] 1 All Eng. Rep. at 64, 67. 
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factual circumstances.261 In subsequent decisions, the strongest advocates for invoking 
legislative history have reiterated that even when Pepper’s three-part test for admissibility was 
satisfied, a court still must assign weight to the ministerial statements in light of all relevant 
considerations.262 
Legislative history skeptics on the highest court have effectively adopted the same basic 
approach in a post-Pepper world.  Admissibility of Hansard as a judicial aid is settled, and the  
primary issues that trigger debate are whether courts should accord weight to parliamentary 
proceedings in varying contexts.  Thus for Lord Steyn—the leading judicial critic of Pepper—
Hansard is potentially valuable to courts in order to estop the executive from abandoning its prior 
representations in Parliament as to the meaning of particular words or phrases in text.263 Just 
how valuable Hansard is for this purpose will vary depending on the circumstances in which an 
estoppel argument arises.264 
Similarly, Lord Steyn and other legislative history skeptics recognize that Hansard may 
be of assistance in identifying the mischief at which a textual provision is aimed, and that such a 
role will at times shed light on the meaning of the text under review.265 Judges with reservations 
 
261 See id. at 69 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson); at 51 (Lord Griffiths); at 52 (Lord Oliver of Aylmerton).  Professor 
Vogenauer persuasively argues that the opinions in Pepper accord probative but scarcely binding weight to Hansard, 
preserving for the courts the ultimate constitutional authority to determine the meaning of statutory text.  See 
Vogenauer, note 3 supra at 661-63. 
262 Lord Nicholls in his Spath Holme opinion observed that to say parliamentary materials qualified as an external 
aid meant simply that such materials “are a factor the court will take into account” along with other interpretive 
resources that may assist in construing ambiguous or obscure text.  Spath Holme, [2001] 1 All Eng. Rep. at 218 
(emphasis added).  See also id. at 223 (Lord Cooke) (stating that courts “can in the end derive real help from 
Hansard, even if it is not necessarily decisive help.” (emphasis added); Harding, [2005] 3 WLR at 107 (Lord 
Carswell) (opining that references to Hansard as a confirmatory aid will be helpful on some occasions but not 
others). 
263 See Steyn, supra note 4, at 67, 70; McDonnell, [2004] 1 All Eng. Rep. at 655-56. 
264 Compare, e.g., Spath Holme, [2001] 1 All Eng. Rep. at 227 (Lord Hope) (contending that estoppel rationale was 
properly invoked in Pepper) with Reg. v. A. [2001] UKHL 25, [2001] 3 All Eng. Rep. 1, 28 (Lord Hope) 
(concluding that estoppel rationale carries no persuasive weight under facts of case). 
265 See, e.g., Lesotho Highlands Dev. Auth. v. Impreglio [2005] UKHL 43, [2006] 1 A.C. 221, ____ (Lord Steyn); 
Reg. v. Soneji [2005] UKHL 49, [2005] 4 All Eng. Rep. 321, 324-25 (Lord Steyn); Reg. v. A. [2001] 3 All Eng. 
Rep. at 47-48 (Lord Hutton). 
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about some uses of legislative history also are prepared—in suitable circumstances—to rely on 
the record of a statute’s drafting history to aid in understanding statutory language.266 
The debate within the Law Lords between legislative history advocates and skeptics is 
thus about weight more than admissibility.  Some judges contend that Hansard should never be 
used to help identify parliamentary intent as to the meaning of enacted words or phrases, but 
even they agree that Hansard can be valuable in a range of other interpretive settings.  
Disagreements on the high court since Pepper suggest the judges are searching for an appropriate 
balance in terms of how often to use legislative history, not whether it should be relied on at all.  
These disagreements, informed by concern over possible costs imposed on parties and their 
counsel who comb through Hansard and on lower court judges who must evaluate the results of 
such searches, have produced a lively and at times nuanced set of exchanges. 
 By contrast, recent debate on the Supreme Court between legislative history advocates 
and skeptics has generally been cast in all-or-nothing form.  Justice Scalia has shaped the terms 
of this debate, insisting that judges ought never to consult, much less rely on, legislative history 
when construing statutes.267 In support of his position, Justice Scalia has advanced constitutional 
and practical arguments for why courts should eschew all reference to legislative history.268 He 
has been joined in this blanket rule approach on some occasions by Justice Thomas, but after 
 
266 See Reg. (Jackson) v. Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56, [2005] 4 All Eng. Rep. 1253, 1263-64 (Lord 
Bingham). 
267 See e.g., Scalia, supra note 154, at 31-37; Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 518-28 (1993) (Scalia J., concurring 
in judgment); Zedner v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 1976, 1990-91 (2006) (Scalia J., concurring in judgment).  
268 For constitutional arguments, see, e.g., Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 621 (1991) (Scalia, 
J. concurring in judgment) (invoking separation of powers considerations); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 
452-53 (1987) (Scalia J., concurring in judgment) (invoking legislative supremacy considerations).  For practical 
arguments, see, e.g., Conroy v. Aniskoff, supra note 267, 507 U.S. at 519 (invoking litigation costs to parties); 
Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98-99 (1989) (Scalia J., concurring in judgment) (invoking likelihood of 
opportunistic behavior in creation of legislative history). 
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twenty years by no one else on the Court.269 Several justices have responded to the Scalia 
critique, defending or justifying the basic utility of legislative history, albeit with relatively spare 
arguments.270 The first term of the Roberts Court suggests there will be no new converts to the 
Scalia position—indeed Justice Alito in one of his first majority opinions drew a sharp rebuke 
for invoking legislative history to help confirm the Court’s construction of language in a criminal 
statute.271 
Justice Scalia’s deeply skeptical views were manifested most recently in Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld.272 An important issue in that case was whether the 2005 Detainee Treatment Act 
(DTA) deprived the federal courts of jurisdiction over a habeas corpus petition, pending at the 
time of DTA enactment, that was brought by an alien who had been detained by the Department 
of Defense at an American prison in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.273 
Justice Stevens for the majority concluded that both the DTA text and its legislative 
history reflected Congress’s determination not to remove habeas jurisdiction for cases pending at 
the time of enactment.274 In his reliance on the legislative record, Justice Stevens invoked the 
DTA’s drafting history, noting that Congress had rejected earlier proposed versions of the statute 
 
269 See, e.g., Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 219 (1994) (Scalia and Thomas, JJ., concurring); 
Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 172 n.1 (1993) (reflecting views of JJ. Scalia and Thomas).  Justice Scalia is 
supported by members of the academic community who share his belief that legislative history should never be 
consulted.  See, e.g., Vermeule, supra note 156, Manning, supra note 156, Nagle, supra note 156. 
270 For examples of abbreviated defenses, see e.g. Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 518 n.12 (1993) (Stevens, J.); 
United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 516 n.8 (1992) (Souter, J.); Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor 
v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 611-12 n.4 (1991) (White, J.).  For a more detailed justification, see Bank One Chicago v. 
Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 254, 276-78 (1996) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
271 See Zedner v. United States, 126 S. Ct. at 1985-86 (2006) (Alito, J. relying on Senate and House committee 
reports); id. at 1990-91 (Scalia, J. concurring in judgment, criticizing majority’s reliance on legislative history as 
predicated on a “naïve belief” in the imputation of collective intent from a committee report statement, and as 
“especially…ill-advised” in this case).  See also Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to 
be Chief Justice of the United States, Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 318-19 
(2005) (statement by then-nominee Roberts that “I have quoted and looked to legislative history in the past [as an 
appellate judge] to help determine the meaning of ambiguous terms, and I would expect to follow the same approach 
on the Supreme Court.”). 
272 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2815-17 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
273 See 126 S. Ct. at 2259, 2762-69 (majority opinion). 
274 See id. at 2765-69 (setting forth majority conclusions based on text and legislative history). 
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that would have removed the jurisdiction at issue.275 Justice Stevens also pointed to the floor 
statement of a leading Senate co-sponsor, delivered during debate preceding the Senate vote, 
while discounting contrary statements by two other Senate co-sponsors because they had been 
inserted into the Congressional Record after the Senate debate and vote had taken place.276 
Justice Scalia in dissent took aim at both prongs of the majority’s legislative history 
position.  He insisted that the timing of floor statements by Senate sponsors was entirely 
irrelevant because such statements by individual members lacked any probative significance.277 
Similarly, Justice Scalia reaffirmed his view that there was no reason ever to rely on the drafting 
history accompanying a bill’s enactment.278 
Supreme Court justices who are prepared to rely on legislative history in at least some 
circumstances regularly attach weight to distinctions such as those between pre-enactment and 
post-enactment statements, or between live floor debate and inserted remarks; they also regularly 
regard drafting history as probative under certain conditions.  Even British judges who have 
voiced serious reservations about legislative history have accorded weight in some circumstances 
both to live parliamentary exchanges and to drafting history.279 They do so because they 
subscribe implicitly if not expressly to the principle of reasonably imputed institutional 
approval—that the value accorded to legislative history in a given case is linked to whether 
congressional or parliamentary materials can persuasively be deemed to have been noticed, 
understood, and endorsed by a presumptively reasonable legislator.280 This is not the place to 
address the relative merits of conceptual and practical disagreements between Justice Scalia and 
 
275 See id. at 2766. 
276 See id. at 2766-67 n.10. 
277 Id. at 2815-16.  
278 See id. at 2817. 
279 See, e.g. Ghaidan, [2004] 3 All Eng. Rep. at 426-27 (Lord Steyn, crediting live parliamentary exchange); 
Jackson, [2005] 4 All Eng. Rep. at 1263-64, 1268 (Lord Bingham, crediting drafting history). 
280 See text accompanying notes 167-170 supra (discussing this principle as evidenced in writings of Justice Stevens, 
Breyer, and Souter).  See generally Brudney, supra note 173, at 75-80. 
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his colleagues regarding the status of legislative history.  What matters for present purposes is 
that because of Justice Scalia’s committed opposition to any form of legislative history usage, 
conceptual disagreements among the justices are almost inevitably cast in terms of admissibility 
rather than weight.281 
A less noticed side effect of this conceptual debate has been the relatively impoverished 
nature of the dialogue on the Court regarding how to approach legislative history as an 
interpretive asset.  While members of the Law Lords grapple with different ways in which 
Hansard might or might not assist in illuminating the meaning of enacted text, members of the 
Supreme Court have focused on the threshold issue of admissibility.  One could imagine a more 
enlightening set of judicial exchanges addressed to the relative utility of legislative history in 
diverse settings.  There would be ample scope for such exchanges given that sources of 
legislative history evidence generated by Congress are at once richer and potentially more 
perplexing than what is produced within Parliament. 
 For instance, should legislative history be regarded as presumptively more valuable to 
help resolve textual ambiguities that stem from lack of foresight rather than lack of political 
consensus?  Is legislative history accompanying omnibus bills generally less suitable for judicial 
 
281 Justice Scalia does on occasion engage legislative history advocates on their own terms, arguing that the 
legislative history evidence is contextually unpersuasive even indulging the assumption it is admissible.  See, e.g., 
Hamdan, supra, 126 S. Ct. at 2816 (arguing that majority exaggerates the one-sidedness of pre-enactment floor 
debate); Babbitt v. Sweet Home 515 U.S. 687, 726-30 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that majority 
overvalues committee report evidence while undervaluing certain floor statement evidence).  Moreover, Justice 
Scalia has carved out at least one exception to his blanket rule:  courts may consult legislative history in the rare 
instances when such history would enable them to avoid an absurd result apparently dictated by text.  See Green v. 
Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).  Nonetheless, Justice 
Scalia has expressed his fundamental objections to any use of legislative history with conviction and perseverance, 
and his position has become the singular focus for debate and interchange among the justices as to the 
methodological value of this resource.   
Justice Scalia’s skepticism regarding legislative history is an integral part of his larger jurisprudential 
campaign to restrict judicial choice or discretion in the interpretation of statutes. See generally, Scalia, supra note 
154; Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHIC. L. REV. 1175 (1989); Jonathan Siegel, The 
Polymorphic Principle and the Judicial Role in Statutory Interpretation, 84 TEX. L. REV. 339, 370-71 (2005).  The 
view that use of legislative history promotes judicial discretion and textualism confines such discretion is seriously 
contested, but is beyond the scope of this article. 
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use because congressional deals on such a grand scale are simply indecipherable?  Should 
legislative history in certain subject areas be presumed to have less weight where the law is 
administered primarily by a federal agency rather than private parties, or where the statutory text 
tends to be detailed and technical rather than open-ended and of more general public interest?  
There are no ready answers to such questions, and legal scholars are contributing to the 
conversation.282 But in light of the current Court’s fault line focused on the threshold 
admissibility of legislative history, the justices have played little role in exploring prospects for 
how legislative history can or should be valued differently in varying circumstances, an 
exploration that is thriving among the Law Lords. 
2.  Applying Legislative History—A Lesson for the Law Lords? 
It is still early in Britain’s post-Pepper period, but the Law Lords have created a series of 
putative bright-line classifications to channel how legislative history may be invoked as an 
interpretive asset.  There is some question as to whether these distinctions among multiple 
categories can withstand prolonged scrutiny, but the court’s approach seems in part an effort to 
impose order in a new and unfamiliar area of responsibility. 
 As described more generally in Part I.C above, the Law Lords have recognized two 
categories of Hansard usage as unproblematic and as having the potential for general application.  
First, Hansard may be consulted by a court to identify the mischief at which a law is aimed, with 
the court then applying the mischief-avoidance purpose to assist in construing text.  Thus, for 
instance, the Law Lords invoked a ministerial discussion of the philosophy behind the 1996 
 
282 See e.g., William Eskridge, Jr. Book Review:  No Frills Textualism, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2041, 2074-75 (2006); 
Elizabeth Garrett, Attention to Context in Statutory Interpretation:  Applying the Lessons of Dynamic Statutory 
Interpretive to Omnibus Legislation, ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, Nov. 2002, art. 1 at 6-15, 
http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss3/art1; Michael Livingston, Practical Reason, “Purposivism,” and the Interpretation 
of Tax Statutes, 51 TAX L. REV. 677 (1996); Merrill, supra note 253. 
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Arbitration Act when deciding that an arbitrator’s error of law, standing alone, could not be 
challenged in Court as “the tribunal exceeding its powers” under the statute.283 
The second broadly applicable unproblematic category draws on legislative history 
materials to assist in understanding what the government’s policy is when the court reviews 
agency decisions for basic fairness or rationality.  In this context, the Law Lords have relied on 
ministerial explanations in Parliament to help understand government sentencing procedures that 
allegedly abridged the right to a fair tribunal284 and government policies for compensating 
miscarriages of justice when those policies were alleged to be inadequate.285 
Apart from these two categories, described as “innocuous” in a leading 2003 decision,286 
some Law Lords have identified a third assertedly noncontroversial use of Hansard, premised on 
a rationale of estoppel against the government.  This category is meant to prohibit the 
government from abandoning in court a clear representation previously made in Parliament with 
respect to the meaning of certain statutory words or phrases, or with regard to a government 
commitment not to exercise its power in a given situation.287 The estoppel rationale for limiting 
 
283 See Lesotho Highlands Dev. Auth. v. Impreglio, [2005] 3 All Eng. Rep. 789, 798-99 (Lord Steyn).  See also Reg. 
v. Soneji and another, [2005] 4 All Eng. Rep. 321, 324-25 (Lord Steyn) (relying on parliamentary statements 
identifying a need to avoid quashing confiscation orders “merely because some procedural error has taken place” 
when upholding a trial court’s belated confiscation order under the 1995 Proceeds of Crime Act). 
284 See Reg. (Anderson) v. Sec’y of State for Home Dept. [2002] UKHL 46, [2002] 4 All Eng. Rep. 1089, 1093, 
1095 (Lord Bingham), 1104-05 (Lord Steyn).  
285 See Reg. (Mullen) v. Sec’y of State for Home Dept. [2004] UKHL 18, [2004] 3 All Eng. Rep. 65, 72 (Lord 
Bingham), 79-82 (Lord Steyn). 
286 Wilson v. First County Trust Ltd., [2003] 4 All Eng. Rep. 97, 117 (Lord Nicholls). 
287 See Wilson supra at 122 (Lord Hope) (discussing estoppel rationale with respect to meaning of certain words);  
Ex p. Spath Holme, [2001] 1 All Eng. Rep. 195, 212 (Lord Bingham) (discussing estoppel rationale with respect to 
scope of government powers). 
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Hansard use has recently been questioned on conceptual grounds,288 but in any event this 
category can be expected to have a very narrow application.289 
In addition to certain agreed-upon roles for legislative history, the Law Lords have 
identified several distinct areas as contentious.  A fourth category of Hansard usage that has 
become controversial is the one at the core of the Pepper decision.  Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s 
determination—that courts may and at times should rely on statements during parliamentary 
debates as an aid to the construction of enacted words or phrases—continues to be endorsed by 
many members of the high court but has been renounced by some others.290 The Law Lords also 
have declared Hansard references off limits in a fifth and sixth setting regarded as suspect.  In 
Spath Holme, the court announced that (subject to the improbable government estoppel 
exception) ministerial statements addressed to the scope of a government’s statutory powers 
were inadmissible in court.291 In Wilson, the Law Lords further concluded that in reviewing 
domestic legislation challenged as incompatible with European convention law under the 1998 
Human Rights Act, courts could not consult Hansard to aid in resolving issues of 
compatibility.292 
The distinctions among these various categories may at a minimum require some 
adjustment as new controversies arise.  For example, the Spath Holme decision involved a 
challenge to the government’s exercise of its statutory authority to “provide for…restricting or 
 
288 See Sales, supra note 142, at 589-90 (contending that insofar as a statute is enacted to bind citizens as well as the 
government, it makes little sense to conclude—under an estoppel rationale—that the text should have one meaning 
when applied to the government and another meaning when applied to private citizens. 
289 The Law Lords have described the prospect of a minister assuring Parliament that certain discretionary powers 
would never be used as “improbable[e]” and “most unlikely,” (Ex p. Spath Holme, [2001] 1 All Eng. Rep. at 216).  
The court’s discussion of estoppel in the meaning-of-words context has focused almost exclusively on whether this 
rationale confines the scope of the holding in Pepper itself.  See, e.g., McDonnell, [2004] 1 All Eng. Rep. at 655-56 
(Lord Steyn); Wilson, [2003] 4 All Eng. Rep. at 130-31 (Lord Hope).   
290 See text accompanying notes 124-142 supra.
291 See Ex p. Spath Holme, discussed supra at text accompanying notes 112-113. 
292 See Wilson, discussed supra at text accompanying notes 116-120. 
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preventing increases of rent.”293 Assuming arguendo that a minister’s parliamentary statement 
clearly set forth the justification behind the creation of this power to “restrict[] or prevent[] 
increases,” it is not obvious why such legislative history should be excluded as bearing on the 
scope of government power rather than taken seriously as relating to the meaning of an enacted 
phrase.294 Similarly, when considering the proportionality of a statutory provision under the 
Human Rights Act, it is puzzling that the court may find Hansard materials inadmissible to help 
determine matters of compatibility, yet useful because related to the background mischief at 
which the provision is aimed.295 
Whether the particular lines drawn by the Law Lords when applying legislative history 
are sustainable in practical and conceptual terms is beyond the scope of this article.  For present 
comparative law purposes, what stands out is that the judges on the highest court have created as 
many as six presumptively strict categories in the course of determining that judicial reliance on 
Hansard may in different settings be innocuously helpful, controversial yet beneficial, or 
troubling and unwelcome.  As for why the court has adopted this somewhat rigid approach, it 
may be that such linedrawing is regarded by the judges, even if subconsciously, as the best way 
of giving shape to a dramatic new set of responsibilities. 
 Rules are often favored as legal directives because they are perceived as providing a level 
of certainty or predictability.296 The Law Lords may well regard their efforts at classification as 
 
293 1985 Landlord and Tenant Act, §31(1), quoted in Spath Holme, [2001] 1 All Eng. Rep. at 200. 
294 Compare, id. at 212 (Lord Bingham) (regarding Hansard as inadmissible) with id. at 215, 218-19 (Lord Nicholls) 
(regarding Hansard as admissible but not persuasive in this instance) and id. at 219-23 (Lord Cooke) (regarding 
Hansard as admissible and helpful in this instance). 
295 See Reg. (Williamson) v. Sec’y for Educ. and Empl. [2005] UKHL 15, [2005] 2 All Eng. Rep. 1, 10, 16-17 (Lord 
Nicholls) (recognizing that proportionality of provision prohibiting parent-supported corporal punishment by 
teachers at a religious school “is to be judged objectively and not by the quality of the reasons advanced…in the 
course of parliamentary debate” while also noting with approval that the debate featured consideration of whether to 
override parental choice and specifically discussed the Convention rights of parents).  
296 See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword:  The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 62 
(1992). 
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furnishing important guidance to lower courts that have entered an interpretive domain deemed 
off limits for centuries.  Such guidance may be especially apt because early evidence indicates 
fairly substantial Hansard usage by lower courts.297 Further, such a rule-based approach may be 
part of a judicial effort to channel if not confine attorney appetites for this new asset.298 
Attorneys’ interest in parliamentary materials creates additional burdens for judges, because the 
required submission of Hansard extracts accompanied by a written summary of argument 
imposes an extra obligation on courts that rely heavily on oral presentations and that lack law 
clerks to aid in the review and analysis of such pre-hearing submissions.299 Finally, the Law 
Lords themselves seem somewhat wary of what they have wrought,300 and a series of ostensibly 
sharp lines may lend structure to what is for them a rather open-ended enterprise. 
 In contrast to the Law Lords’ sudden exposure to Hansard, the Supreme Court has been 
invoking committee reports, floor statements, and drafting history to assist in construing statutes 
on a fairly regular basis for more than half a century.301 Over this period, the Court has not 
articulated bright line rules or even a terribly structured approach for legislative history usage.  
Instead, the Justices have applied a rather amorphous standard based on reliability, an approach 
that tends to take account of the totality of circumstances in a given case. 
 To be sure, there is a broadly recognized hierarchy of reliable legislative history sources. 
Conference reports, standing committee reports, and explanatory floor statements by bill 
 
297 See sources cited in note 141, supra.
298 In this regard, see also text accompanying notes 64-66 supra (setting forth procedural hurdles to use of Hansard 
by counsel, including sanctions for noncompliance). 
299 See note 66, supra and accompanying text (discussing special pre-hearing submission requirements for use of 
Hansard).  See generally House of Lords, Practice Directions Applicable to Civil Appeals 21-25 (2006), available at 
www.publications.parliament.uk. (describing components of skeletal argument to be submitted by counsel in 
advance of hearing, and noting that oral arguments may last more than 17.5 hours (four sitting days)). 
300 See, e.g., Robinson, supra, [2002] N. Ir. L. R. 390, 405 (Lord Hoffman); Reg. (Jackson) v. Attorney General, 
[2005] 4 All Eng. Rep. 1253, 1285 (Lord Steyn). 
301 See sources at note 16, supra.
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sponsors or managers are clustered near the top,302 while legislative inaction, statements by 
nonlegislative drafters, and post-enactment history are arrayed close to the bottom.303 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court often finds committee report evidence to be unhelpful or 
legislative inaction to be highly probative based on the factors at hand, and the justices do not 
appear especially dedicated to assigning any given source a predictable place within the 
hierarchy.304 In addition, legislative history sources of all kinds are often regarded as more 
valuable or useful to help address the meaning of inconclusive text than to confirm, question, or 
supplant the meaning of text that is clear.305 Yet the Court continues to consult legislative 
history even when the text itself is unambiguous,306 and it justifies this practice in the face of 
other decisions that seem bent on prohibiting it.307 
The Supreme Court’s approach when applying legislative history is open to criticism for 
being overly vague, and the concept of reliability is not easy to pin down.  Professors Eskridge, 
Frickey, and Garrett have referred generally to whether a given committee report or floor 
manager’s statement constitutes “reliable evidence of consensus within the legislature that can be 
routinely discerned by interpreters,”308 and I discussed earlier whether legislative record 
evidence “can persuasively be deemed to have been noticed, understood, and endorsed by a 
 
302 See Eskridge et al., supra note 185, at 311-12; Kent Greenawalt, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: 20 QUESTIONS 
173 (1999). 
303 See Eskridge et al., supra at 315-17; Greenawalt, supra at 174-75. 
304 For example, on the issue of whether courts should rely on the silence of legislative history as evidence that a 
statutory amendment effecting a potentially substantial change in policy has not done so, compare e.g., Harrison v. 
PPG Industries 446 U.S. 578, 592 (1980) (stating that “in ascertaining the meaning of a statute, a court cannot, in the 
manner of Sherlock Holmes, pursue the theory of the dog that did not bark”) (emphasis added) with Chisom v. 
Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 396 (1991) (relying on legislative history silence as probative that Congress lacked an intent 
to make a major policy change, likening “Congress’s silence in this regard…to the dog that didn’t bark”).  See 
generally Siegel, supra note 281, at 385-89. 
305 See generally Breyer, supra note 178, at 848. 
306 See, e.g., Zedner v. United States, supra note 271, Gen. Dynamics Land Sys. Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 586-89 
(2004). 
307 See, e.g., United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 6 (1997); Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 
(1992) (citation omitted).  See generally Siegel supra note 281, at 386. 
308 See Eskridge et al., supra note 185, at 304 (emphasis on “reliable” omitted). 
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presumptively reasonable legislator.”309 Although each of these formulations leaves ample—
some would say excessive—room for the exercise of judicial discretion, there are certain 
advantages to the use of such an interpretive approach. 
One benefit is that the reliability standard is flexible enough for judges to adapt its 
application as relevant factors change over time.310 For example, because of advances in 
technology such as electronic voting and live telecasts of floor proceedings, members spend 
considerably less time than they used to on the floor of the House or Senate, either debating and 
listening to one another or discussing privately how they expect to vote.311 It seems reasonable 
to infer from this change that floor statements, even those delivered by bill managers, should less 
readily be deemed to have been noticed and endorsed by presumptively reasonable legislators 
when those legislators’ presence on the floor has become principally associated with the ringing 
of a bell to announce a timed vote.312 There is some evidence that in the aggregate the Court’s 
reliance on floor statements as a proportion of its overall legislative history reliance has declined 
substantially since the late 1980s.313 This decline warrants further investigation, but it seems 
plausible that the justices, and litigants who appear before them, may be adjusting their sense of 
 
309 See text accompanying note 280 supra.
310 See generally Sullivan, supra note 296, at 66. 
311 See, e.g., RENEWING CONGRESS: A SECOND REPORT  57 (The American Enterprise Institute and The Brookings 
Institution 1993); George E. Connor & Bruce I. Oppenheimer, Deliberation:  An Untimed Value in a Timed Game, 
in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 315, 324-25 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds. 5th ed. 1993); Joseph 
M. Bessette, THE MILD VOICE OF REASON: DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 
151-53 (1994).  Members also come to the chamber floor less often due to other factors, such as the need to spend 
considerable time raising money for re-election campaigns. 
312 See Greenawalt, supra note 302, at 175-76 (contending that because fewer members are present or paying 
attention to floor debates today, reliance on those floor debates to reflect collective legislative intent is less 
persuasive). 
313 Preliminary findings are derived from the dataset of 650 Supreme Court decisions on workplace law compiled by 
the author.  See note 145 supra. Brudney and Ditslear have looked at the Court’s reliance on different legislative 
history sources, measured in five-year intervals starting with 1969-73 and ending with 1999-2003.  They found that 
reliance on House floor statements dropped from more than 40 percent of all majority opinions using legislative 
history during the early and mid 1980s to well below 20 percent of such cases after 1988.  Reliance on Senate floor 
statements as a percentage of all cases relying on legislative history declined from more than 50 percent in the 1980s 
to roughly 15 percent in the period since 1993.  A copy of these preliminary results is on file with the author; 
Brudney and Ditslear are pursuing further research in this area. 
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what constitutes reliable legislative history in response to changing realities of the lawmaking 
process. 
 Another possible advantage of a less rule-oriented focus is that it forces judges to 
acknowledge that they are exercising discretion when invoking some legislative history sources 
and not others, or relying on that history for some reasons and not others.  In this regard, the 
Supreme Court’s ad hoc approach to applying legislative history may reflect the increased sense 
of assurance that accompanies a more mature or settled stage of jurisprudence on this topic.  The 
Court has been making use of legislative history for several generations, and the current justices 
have been exposed in their education if not their experience to various complexities of the 
lawmaking process.314 It is therefore not surprising that those who make regular use of 
legislative history seem comfortable separating wheat from chaff on an individual case basis in 
much the same way they do when applying other interpretive resources.315 
Over time, British judges—educated and experienced in common law traditions and 
practice—may come to adapt their initial approach to the dynamic realities of European as well 
as domestic events.  The recent opinions in Jackson and Harding suggest an evolving awareness 
of how Pepper read literally may unduly confine the court’s ability to make constructive use of 
Hansard.  Given these developments, it seems possible and perhaps desirable that the Law Lords 
 
314 To be sure, fewer justices today have first-hand legislative experience than was the case in the decades preceding 
1970.  See James J. Brudney, Foreseeing Greatness?  Measurable Performance Criteria and the Selection of 
Supreme Court Justices, 32 FLA. ST. L. REV. 1015, 1049 (2005).  Still, all have been exposed to the legislative 
process in college and/or law school, most have had years of experience sifting the products of that process as 
appellate judges, and presumably many if not all follow congressional developments and disagreements as 
intelligent consumers of the Washington media. 
315 A proponent of legislative history in the U.S. might well respond that Britain’s rule-based approach would do a 
better job of limiting the discretion available to Supreme Court justices, and that limiting judicial choice in this area 
is especially desirable given the volume and diversity of legislative history sources typically available in the 
American context.  Whether the Court’s reliability standard would be enhanced if the justices were to endorse and 
adhere to one or more subsidiary guidelines presumptively constraining the uses of legislative history warrants 
further consideration in another setting. 
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consider a more flexible and less rule-bound approach when determining how best to rely on 
parliamentary materials. 
CONCLUSION 
Fourteen years after Pepper v. Hart, the Law Lords remain in the initial stages of a 
fruitful debate concerning the appropriate uses of legislative history.  This article suggests that 
the British court’s applications and refinements of Pepper, when viewed from a comparative 
perspective, can contribute to a deeper understanding of certain interpretive challenges facing 
our own federal judiciary. 
 Both the Law Lords and the Supreme Court rely on legislative record evidence to help 
clarify the meaning of statutory text.  Some of the judicial rhetoric in Britain reflects concern that 
Pandora’s Box has been opened, while discussion regarding recent Supreme Court practice has 
focused on the trend toward limiting judicial usage.  Notwithstanding these perceptions, the 
comparative reality is that over the past decade, Supreme Court use of legislative history well 
exceeds Law Lords references to Hansard.  An analysis of factors related to the legislative 
process within each country helps account for why this substantial difference exists and is likely 
to remain in place for the foreseeable future. 
 At the same time, the article’s examination of aggregate data and doctrinal developments 
since 1992 suggests that the Law Lords will continue to rely on parliamentary materials and may 
well extend the permissible scope of Hansard references.  From a comparative standpoint, it is 
intriguing that British legal culture, which shares our basic approach to judicial review of 
statutory meaning, now finds enhanced interpretive value in the historical materials that help fuel 
the legislative process.  By endorsing the legitimacy and utility of Hansard, the Law Lords may 
in effect be exerting subtle normative pressure on those who would reject legislative history 
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altogether in the U.S. setting.  In contrast to Britain, our legislative record features an especially 
informative resource—committee reports—and explanatory materials that regularly shed light on 
the bargains endemic to our lawmaking enterprise.  Those distinctive assets would seem to argue 
for our becoming more attentive to the nuances of positive reliance on legislative history, rather 
than simply continuing to debate the merits of its wholesale exclusion. 
 Finally, the comparative explanations and analyses presented here should be viewed as a 
first step in the development of an ongoing research agenda.  It is important to examine, for 
instance, how British lower courts have used Hansard under the rule of Pepper, and how they 
respond to the Law Lords’ most recent signals in Jackson and Harding. In addition, British 
courts have long made use of traditional textualist resources such as dictionaries and language 
canons when interpreting statutes.316 It would be worth exploring how the admissibility of 
parliamentary materials is affecting previously settled judicial practices in this regard.  As 
legislative history becomes a more established element in Britain’s approach to statutory 
interpretation, there will doubtless be other ways to pursue how courts in that country consider 
what is below the surface and yet fairly understood to be part of enacted text. 
 
316 See, e.g., Mandla v. Dowell Lee, [1983] 1 All Eng. Rep. 1062, 1065-66 (invoking several dictionary definitions 
of contested statutory phrase); Queens Univ. of Belfast v. Comm’r of Valuation, [2002] RA 189, ___ (Land Tribunal 
for N. Ire.) (invoking language canon of ejusdem generis). 
